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Foreword
Newport Paper No. 29, Shaping the Security Environment, edited by Derek S. Reveron,
makes an important contribution to an unfolding debate on the global role of U.S. mil-
itary forces in an era of transnational terrorism, failed or failing states, and globaliza-
tion. Reveron, professor of national security decision making at the Naval War College,
looks beyond the current conflicts in which the United States is involved to raise fun-
damental questions concerning the regional diplomatic roles of America’s combatant
commanders (COCOMs) and, more generally, the entire array of nonwarfighting func-
tions that have become an increasingly important part of the day-to-day life of the
American military as it engages a variety of partners or potential partners around the
world. These functions are increasingly being given doctrinal definition and a larger
role in U.S. military planning under the novel concept of “shaping.” This volume is
intended to explore the notion of shaping in its various aspects, both generally and in
several regional contexts.
The changing role of the regional COCOMs (formerly CINCs) over the last dozen
years or so is the focus of a paper by General Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps
(Ret.), who provides a characteristically frank and illuminating account of his own
tenure as commander of the U.S. Central Command, with responsibilities for the
Persian Gulf and the greater Middle East. Papers by Commander Alan Lee Boyer,
USN (Ret.), and Stephen A. Emerson examine maritime and regional security coop-
eration from the perspective of the U.S. European Command on the one hand and,
on the other, the Combined Task Force–Horn of Africa, a joint organization head-
quartered in Djibouti that has played a critical role in recent years in strengthening
the capabilities of countries throughout the region to improve their own security and
counter terrorism.
Two further chapters examine aspects of shaping from a global perspective. Ronald
E. Ratcliffe provides a searching analysis of the “thousand-ship navy” initiative pro-
posed several years ago by outgoing Chief of Naval Operations Michael Mullen, in-
cluding the difficulties the U.S. Navy has had in operationalizing this concept—and
the difficulties some of our allies and partners continue to have in coming to terms
with it. Ratcliffe makes a number of useful recommendations as to how the Navy can
make headway in the area of maritime security cooperation in the coming years,
which is likely to figure prominently in the new maritime strategy the Navy is
currently developing. Finally, Dennis Lynn looks at “strategic communication,” also a
relatively new concept that is intended to bring greater coherence to the way the U.S.
military thinks about the overall impact of its words and actions abroad and how it
can better craft messages to shape the environment—friendly as well as adversarial—
in which it finds itself today.
C A R N E S L O R D
Director, Naval War College Press
Newport, Rhode Island
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A volume like this requires many people thinking, critiquing, cajoling, and writing. First
and foremost, Joan Johnson-Freese and Tom Fedyszyn in the National Security Decision
Making Department at the U.S. Naval War College continue to create an atmosphere
where good teaching and scholarly research can occur without compromising either. No
less important is the vision Cary Lord and Pel Boyer at the Naval War College Press have
for the Newport Papers series; I am grateful they find this research on shaping interesting
and useful to military officers, policy makers, scholars, and analysts.
The papers in this volume had numerous external readers. In particular, Kathleen
Mahoney-Norris, Judith Stiehm, Chris Costa, Chris Fettweis, Andy Stigler, Tom
Fedyszyn, Mike Morris, and Gene Christy provided important criticisms throughout.
Editorially, I greatly benefited from Kirie Reveron, who tirelessly reads all of my work
and is the best sounding board any scholar can have.
As a concept, my original thinking on shaping was formed during my tenure at NATO’s
military headquarters (SHAPE) in the late 1990s. While I expected to encounter a mili-
tary focus on NATO, I was struck by how important the military is in what I had
thought were nonmilitary activities, such as diplomacy and development. I am grateful
to those officers I served and sparred with on the military’s role in what I now recog-
nize is a traditional military task—bringing peace and stability to facilitate democrati-
zation and development. My SHAPE experience produced the book America’s Viceroys,
but I am grateful to Toby Wahl for encouraging me to dig deeper into my experiences
to uncover the larger theoretical and strategic basis for shaping presented here.
Shaping the Security Environment
DEREK S. REVERON
During my time as a CINC, I was asked to carry out presidential and
other diplomatic missions that would normally have fallen to diplomats.
I’m sure such things frustrated the State Department, but I don’t think
they disapproved. In fact, they were very supportive. It was more a case
of: “Well, if we can’t do it, at least somebody is taking care of it. If it’s the
CINCs, then God bless them.” In fact, more often than not, the ambassa-
dors were very glad we were there. We not only brought them the con-
nections we’d made, but we provided them with the ability to get things
done they couldn’t ordinarily do.
GENERAL TONY ZINNI, USMC (RET.)
As the epigraph reveals, combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as
they are warfighters, fulfilling as they do important diplomatic roles for the United
States.1 While the State Department is America’s lead foreign policy organization, the
Defense Department, whether in peace or war, cannot escape these roles. Moreover, it
has a distinct advantage compared with the State Department both in size and
resources, with an operating budget sixty times greater.2 With its forward presence,
large planning staffs, and various engagement tools, America’s geographic combatant
commanders are well equipped for these engagement tasks, and increasingly welcome
them. Today, they routinely pursue regional-level engagement strategies by hosting
international security conferences, promoting military-to-military contacts, and pro-
viding American military presence, training, and equipment. The Defense Department
fills an important role in U.S. foreign affairs. This role, which is now commonly
referred to by the term “shaping,” is the subject of this volume.
In spite of the size disparity between State and Defense, the two organizations are
mainly mutually supporting. American ambassadors are the president’s representatives
to a particular country, and U.S. military commanders assist in formulating and imple-
menting the president’s foreign policy. Both departments advance and defend national
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interests. Yet the Defense Department’s size and operational orientation give it signifi-
cant advantages in the interagency arena. For example, when President George W. Bush
announced that the United States would become more strategically engaged in Africa,
it was through the creation of a new military command—U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM)—and not simply upgrading the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment or the State Department’s Africa Bureau. Yet, tellingly, this new “combatant”
command will have a decidedly interagency focus, as the president’s vision for it sug-
gests.3 The focus is intended to serve not only and indeed not primarily operational
military purposes but the broader tasks associated with shaping—“to promote stability
and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables them to be cooperative,
trained, and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts.”4
These nonwarfighting roles of the U.S. military have attracted criticism both within
and outside the military itself as being in tension or contradiction with the military’s
warfighting ethos. For example, John Hillen writes: “To maintain the skills necessary to
execute this [warfighting] function requires strategy, doctrine, training, and force
structure focused on deterrence and war fighting, not on peacekeeping missions.”5
Others have questioned whether military officers have or can reasonably be expected to
acquire the linguistic skills and regional political and cultural knowledge to operate
effectively as surrogate diplomats. Yet the fact is that military forces have always had
important nonmilitary roles to play both before and after major combat operations,
with respect to allies and adversaries alike.
Security assistance helps fledgling democracies consolidate, fragile states avoid failure,
and authoritarian states liberalize. When he conducted engagement operations in the
1980s, before the term “shaping” existed, Admiral William J. Crowe, then commander
in chief of Pacific Command, said that national leaders frequently told him that with-
out American military presence their achievements in democracy and development
would not have been possible.6 Security is essential for economic and social develop-
ment. This sentiment is reflected in the Department of Defense document QDR
Roadmap for Building Partnership Capacity, which targets efforts to improve the collec-
tive capabilities and performance of the Defense Department and its partners in
extending governance to under- and ungoverned areas.7 To be sure, shaping is different
in fundamental ways from warfighting. Shaping is about managing relationships, not
command and control; it is about cooperation, not fighting; and it is about partner-
ship, not dominance.
Nonwarfighting activities also fulfill important training, basing, and operational
requirements for American forces. To advance American interests, combatant com-
mands build partners’ capabilities and capacity to generate security, influence
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nonpartners and potential adversaries, mitigate the underlying causes of conflict and
extremism, and enable rapid action when military intervention is required.8 Since com-
bined operations are the norm today, U.S. forces need regular interactions with their
international partners, with shaping constituting what has come to be known as “Phase
Zero” (see figure 1).9
The six-phase model now utilized in current joint doctrine may give the impression
that shaping is something that takes place only during the initial phase of a campaign,
but this is a misapprehension; shaping is an ongoing set of activities, pursued alike in
peacetime, crisis, and war. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations makes clear that
“shaping operations provide the joint force continuous opportunities to assess the
structure and dynamics of potential adversaries and crisis locations to the extent prac-
ticable.”10 Overall, shaping activities fulfill current military strategic requirements of
assuring friends and allies, dissuading potential competitors, and deterring conflicts in
nonlethal ways. Shaping is not necessarily indicative of a precursor to a military cam-
paign. Rather, it has become one tool—and an increasingly important one—in the
arsenal of American “soft power.”
From Coercive Diplomacy to Soft Power
Writing soon after the Berlin Wall fell, former assistant secretary of defense Joseph Nye
commented, “Although the United States still has leverage over particular countries, it
has far less leverage over the [international] system as a whole.”11 Nye observed that not
only was the international system changing from bipolar to unipolar, but that the
nature of state power itself was changing. He claimed that traditional hard power—
principally military and economic—would no longer be the single coin of national
strength in a world that is increasingly interconnected and transparent. Instead, states
and peoples were more likely to be affected through noncoercive measures or soft
power, which Nye defined as “the ability to get what we want through attraction rather
than coercion or payments.”12 This prediction bore itself out in the late 1990s, when
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FIGURE 1
Phasing Model
Source: Adapted from Joint Publication 5-0, fig. IV-9
coercive diplomacy (in Yugoslavia) did not produce the desired effects, and in the early
2000s, in reaction to a post-9/11 American foreign policy.
Consequently, the U.S. government is currently placing renewed emphasis on generat-
ing soft power as a reservoir as a way to facilitate nonmilitary solutions to foreign pol-
icy problems. The Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,
Karen Hughes, has testified to this point: “I believe there is no more important chal-
lenge for our future than the urgent need to foster greater understanding, more respect
and a sense of common interests and common ideals among Americans and people of
different countries, cultures and faiths throughout the world.”13 One way to do this is
through global military engagement, which can build trust and structures of coopera-
tion among key components of foreign societies. As Robert Art notes, “Short of waging
war or playing chicken in a crisis, then, military power shapes outcomes more by its
peacetime presence than by its forceful use.”14 While military leaders have historically
represented their countries abroad, the doctrinal evolution of shaping has its roots in
U.S. military engagement in the 1990s.
Roots of Shaping
President Bill Clinton’s National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, pub-
lished in 1996, recognized the need to shift away from a strategy of containing commu-
nism to one of advancing market-oriented democracies. The strategy directed the
military to engage with international partners and to provide a credible overseas pres-
ence: “Such overseas presence demonstrates our commitment to allies and friends,
underwrites regional stability, ensures familiarity with overseas operating environ-
ments, promotes combined training among the forces of friendly countries, and pro-
vides timely initial response capabilities.”15 Being forward deployed during the Cold
War had taught that “U.S. engagement is indispensable to the forging of stable political
relations and open trade to advance our interests.”16 Included in engagement, then, are
supporting democracy, providing economic assistance, and increasing interactions
between U.S. and other militaries around the world.
Taking its cue from the 1996 strategy, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
sought to codify shaping as a key element in the national military strategic outlook.
Military leaders have always engaged or shaped their areas of responsibility, but the
QDR recognized the need to shift from a Cold War posture to a global one in which
allies and adversaries were less readily identifiable, and hence proactive engagement
with foreign nations became more necessary.17 Positing a new foundation of “shape-
respond-prepare,” the QDR not only emphasized the capability to fight and win two
major theater wars but also placed “greater emphasis on the continuing need to main-
tain continuous overseas presence in order to shape the international environment.”18 A
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major goal of shaping, then, is to reduce the drivers of conflicts through presence and
strengthening partnerships with governmental, regional, and international organizations.19
Facing 1990s conflicts born of state failure in Central Europe, Africa, and Southeast
Asia, U.S. military forces were directed to conduct stabilization, security, transition,
and reconstruction operations with capabilities that had been geared for traditional
warfare. The resulting experiences in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina forced
recognition in Washington that it is far more effective to prevent state failure than to
become involved in the bloody conflicts resulting from them. Stephen Krasner, former
State Department Policy Planning Staff director, captured this point well: “Weak and
failed states pose an acute risk to U.S. and global security.”20 Consequently, the regional
combatant commanders began to step up their engagement efforts. They utilized a
wide variety of traditional means, including: forces rotationally deployed overseas;
forces deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military-to-military
interactions; and programs like defense cooperation, security assistance, and Interna-
tional Military Education and Training (IMET).21 This direction of effort is a decade
old, but it has been reformulated as one of twenty-two joint capability areas (JCAs)
recognized today.
Defining Shaping Operations
A new “joint operating concept” (JOC) elucidating the shaping construct is expected in
late 2007. Absent that, as depicted in figure 2, shaping may be understood as including
a set of distinct activities that combatant commanders use to advance and defend
American interests.22 The Joint Staff (J7) defines shaping as:23
The ability to support Joint Force, Interagency and Multinational operations—inclusive of normal
and routine military activities—performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or
solidify relationships with friends and allies. Shaping is executed continuously with the intent to en-
hance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation in support of defined military and
national strategic objectives and national goals. These activities are designed to assure success by shap-
ing perceptions and influencing behavior of both adversaries and allies. Each capability supporting
Shaping Operations, to include Information Operations, must adapt to a particular theater and envi-
ronment and may be executed in one theater in order to achieve effects in another.24
Since shaping occurs during prehostility periods, commanders can more easily engage
with both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. For example, in 2007,
the USNS Comfort hosted U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Public Health
Service specialists, along with Canadian forces and nongovernmental organizations to
provide free health care services in the Caribbean and Latin America. Further, the defi-
nition underscores that operations must be adapted to a particular theater and environ-
ment. Logically, a naval security cooperation program that works in the Mediterranean
may not work in the Gulf of Guinea. To develop shaping operations, commanders must
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have a nuanced understanding of the countries involved, to include culture, history,
politics, and economy. General Zinni recalls in his contribution to this monograph, “I
found on my journeys that our commitment to stability in the region was widely
appreciated but that our policies and priorities were sometimes questioned. Views of
the threats varied greatly, as did opinions about handling them. The principal com-
plaint was our failure to consult with them not only during but between crises. I found
that cultural awareness was critical to building these relationships.”
Military Diplomacy
Epitomized by the activities of geographic combatant commanders, military diplomacy
brings all instruments of power to bear.25 A primary shaping mission is to develop rela-
tionships and form partnerships. Reflecting on his command (in chapter 2), General
Zinni remarks, “As my experiences throughout the region in general and with [Paki-
stan’s president] Musharraf in particular illustrate, I did not intend to sit back and say,
‘Hey, my job is purely military. When you’re ready to send me in, coach, that’s when I
go in.’ When I assumed command of CENTCOM and had the ability to choose
between fighting fires or preventing them, I chose prevention. If there was any possible
approach to making this a less crisis-prone, more secure and stable region, I wanted to
try it through shaping operations.” With a host of security cooperation tools, General
Zinni shaped his region by hosting regional conferences, building strong security rela-
tionships and allied capabilities, and enhancing the education of military leaders
throughout the Near East and Central Asia. Other geographic combatant commanders
conduct similar activities. When he led forces in Pacific Command, for example,
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FIGURE 2
Joint Capability Area of Joint Shaping
Source: “Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2 Lexicon.”
Admiral Dennis Blair was a critical actor working with China after the 2001 midair col-
lision between an EP-3 and a Chinese F-8. Also, successive commanders of U.S. Euro-
pean Command (EUCOM) facilitated entry of nine countries into NATO and
smoothed relations with Russia over this NATO enlargement.
Military involvement in diplomacy does not or should not conflict with the role of the
Foreign Service: “DoD’s role in shaping the international environment is closely inte-
grated with our diplomatic efforts.”26 In spite of this QDR statement, though, General
Zinni has captured the challenges of synchronizing these activities: “I never found a
way to effectively join forces with the State Department to link their plans with mine. I
had no way to get answers to questions like, What’s the diplomatic component of our
strategy? What’s the economic component? How is aid going to be distributed?”27
While not unique to U.S. Central Command, the task of generating unified action
through the interagency process remains a contemporary national security challenge.
To overcome this, the Joint Staff recently established interagency coordination as one
of its twenty-two “joint capability areas” (JCA). Moreover, some combatant commands
have created an interagency directorate (known as J-9 at U.S. Southern Command, or
SOUTHCOM), and the newest combatant command, AFRICOM, will have a decidedly
interagency orientation when it begins initial operations in October 2007 and full
operations a year later.
Defense Support to Public Diplomacy
Defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) is defined as “the ability to understand,
engage, influence and inform key foreign audiences through words and actions to fos-
ter understanding of U.S. policy and advance American interests, and to collaboratively
shape the operational environment.”28 This capability can include public information
activities as well as information operations designed to reach foreign audiences
through websites, radio, print, and television. DSPD comprises the Defense Depart-
ment’s support to U.S. government public diplomacy, which includes overt interna-
tional public-information activities designed to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives
by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers,
and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their
counterparts abroad. “The current norm of ‘been there, done that’ visits should be
transformed into persistent, personal, and purposeful contacts that yield results.”29 For
example, SOUTHCOM sponsors professional military education conferences to dis-
cuss regional security challenges, approaches to strategy, and capabilities-based plan-
ning. By bringing together key leaders from a particular country or region,
SOUTHCOM facilitates dialogue not only between the United States and other coun-
tries, but also among countries in particular regions, such as the Caribbean, the
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Andean Ridge, or the Southern Cone. Additionally, this can entail providing humani-
tarian assistance.30
Strategic Communication
Strategic communication has been defined as “the ability to focus United States Govern-
ment processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen
or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the
use of coordinated information, themes, plans, and programs, and actions synchronized
with other elements of national power.”31 In general, strategic communication as it is gen-
erally understood (there is still considerable variance in the way the term is used
throughout the American defense establishment) includes three primary elements: pub-
lic affairs, aspects of information operations (particularly psychological operations), and
defense support to public diplomacy. The State Department, in its capacity as the institu-
tional home of public diplomacy, is the lead federal agency for strategic communication,
but as its inclusion in the shaping JCA suggests, the Defense Department must become
engaged too. Yet Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England has noted that “the U.S.
military is not sufficiently organized, trained, or equipped to analyze, plan, and coordi-
nate and integrate the full spectrum of capabilities available to promote America’s inter-
ests.”32 Consequently, the Defense Department is pursuing a series of actions to increase
its ability to conduct strategic communication and institutionalize it as a process. These
actions are outlined in the QDR Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap. Dennis
Lynn argues in chapter 6 of this monograph that “America’s ability to defeat adversaries
will require the creation of new coalition arrangements and taking the informational
offensive.” To win hearts and minds, ideas matter; a strategic narrative that emphasizes a
positive image of hope and opportunity must be promoted to enable international audi-
ences to reject al-Qa‘ida’s message.
Presence
Presence is “the ability to appropriately position forces to advance and defend U.S.
interests by supporting deterrence, projecting power, promoting regional stability and
U.S. security commitments, and ensuring continued access.”33 The general trend since
the 1990s has been to reduce U.S. forward presence because forces are no longer
expected to fight where they are stationed, as they were during in the Cold War. In
European Command, for example, the force has been reduced from 248,000 in 1989 to
fewer than 100,000 today. Overall, the United States closed or turned over to local gov-
ernments 60 percent of its overseas military installations in the 1990s.34 Simultaneously,
EUCOM has also shifted its presence southward and eastward to engage in Eastern
Europe and Africa. This trend continued under the 2004 global posture review and the
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2005 Base Realignment and Closure effort. Essential to basing locations is building and
sustaining political access to support U.S. military action when needed.35
At the same time the base inventory has shrunk, the Navy’s fleet has been reduced too.
While the smaller force is more combat capable, the Global Posture Review and associated
cutbacks undertaken by the Bush administration were primarily focused on seeking effi-
ciencies with a view to conducting combat operations, not on posturing for shaping or
Phase Zero operations.36 Consequently, there are fewer bases and naval assets to serve as
shaping platforms, and it remains to be seen whether rotational forces can create relation-
ships as well as permanent ones. Force protection concerns also impact location and fre-
quency of port visits. Notwithstanding reductions, the United States still maintains bases in
at least forty countries, with the largest concentrations in Iraq, Germany, Afghanistan,
Japan, and South Korea.37 Geographic combatant commands are also represented in Ameri-
can embassies, through offices of defense cooperation and military liaison.
Additionally, the U.S. Navy is experimenting with other ways to enhance presence, such
as “global fleet stations,” which will “establish a self-sustaining sea-base from which to
conduct regional operations, through tailored and adaptive packages, and to launch a
variety of engagements with partner nations within a regional area of interest.”38 By
including trainers, subject matter experts, and medical personnel on a naval platform,
the global fleet station will give the Navy the ability to engage with many countries
during a typical six-month deployment.
Security Cooperation
Security cooperation refers to “the ability for DoD to interact with foreign defense
establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security inter-
ests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition
operations, including allied transformation, improve information exchange, and intel-
ligence sharing to help harmonize views on security challenges, and provide U.S. forces
with peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure.”39 Underlying these
objectives are seven themes: combating terrorism, transforming alliances and building
coalitions for the future, influencing the direction of key powers, cooperating with par-
ties to regional disputes, deterring and isolating problem states, combating weapons of
mass destruction, and realigning the global defense posture.40 For example, in the cam-
paign to combat international terrorism, security cooperation provides training for
indigenous forces.41 To do more of this, in 2006 the Marine Corps created the Foreign
Military Training Unit to “train, advise, and assist friendly host-nation forces—
including naval and maritime military and paramilitary forces—to enable them to sup-
port their governments’ internal security and stability, to counter subversion, and to
reduce the risk of violence from internal and external threats.”42
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Given its shrinking fleet and global challenges, the U.S. Navy too has embraced security
cooperation. Two senior Navy strategists, Vice Admiral John Morgan and Rear Admiral
(then Captain) Charles Martoglio, have declared: “Policing the maritime commons will
require substantially more capability than the United States or any individual nation
can deliver.”43 Accordingly, the United States seeks partnerships with international
navies to create what is being called the “thousand-ship navy,” which could respond to
piracy, smuggling, and other illegal activities and protect important sea lines of com-
munication. The Chief of Naval Operations reinforced this message in 2007: “Wher-
ever the opportunity exists, we must develop and sustain relationships that will help
improve the capacity of our emerging and enduring partners’ maritime forces.”44 In
ways exemplified by Task Force 150 and NATO’s Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, the
thousand-ship navy, more formally known as the Global Maritime Partnership initia-
tive, represents an effort to promote international maritime security. Essential to a suc-
cessful global maritime partnership is building partners’ capabilities and capacity.
Capabilities empower countries to carry out operations, while capacity gives these
countries the ability to sustain the operations over time.
Building Military Partner Capabilities and Capacity
Building military partner capabilities is defined as “the ability to improve the military
capabilities of our allies and partners to help them transform and optimize their forces
to provide regional security, disaster preparedness and niche capabilities in a coali-
tion.”45 As Commander Alan Boyer explores in chapter 3 of this monograph, Com-
mander Naval Forces Europe (CNE) has been developing a capability for maritime
domain awareness throughout Europe and Africa. CNE has been working with NATO
allies and African partners to develop a regional capability to protect trade, natural
resources, and economic development. This includes establishing maritime domain
awareness through the Automated Identification System, an array of coastal radar sys-
tems, and improved command and control of a naval reaction force. A program like
this is a part of a combatant commander’s “theater security cooperation plan” (TSCP),
which serves as the primary blueprint for regional military engagement. To ensure that
other federal assistance is synchronized with the TSCP, the country team prepares a
“mission strategic plan” (MSP) that communicates to senior State Department officials
in Washington how the mission will contribute to achieving the primary goals of
American foreign policy and development assistance in that country.46 In coordination
with the senior Defense representative, the MSP recommends cooperative defense
activities and funding of programs within the International Assistance budget, such as
International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Sales, or Economic
Support Funds, which are critical elements of the TSCP.
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The current focus on transnational threats instead of nation-state competition has been
the impetus for building new partnerships. The goal of capacity building is for partners
to “take on missions that serve our common interests. These efforts range from spurring
allied transformation efforts with NATO through acquisition and combined command-
and-control programs, to security assistance activities that help professionalize the mili-
taries of key partners in the war on terrorism or in peace operations.”47
The benefit to the American personnel is training in new environments and building
relations with their foreign counterparts. The obvious benefit to the international par-
ticipants is in American training and financial assistance, which take on increasing
importance as U.S. forces transform at a pace greater than their partners. These activi-
ties help ease interoperability gaps.
Augmenting military training is Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which supplies
grants and loans to finance purchases of American weapons and military equipment.
The State Department oversees the program, but combatant commanders manage it on
a day-to-day basis. In fiscal year (FY) 2007, the FMF budget was the largest program in
the State Department’s international assistance account (known as the “150 account”),
consuming over $4.5 billion, which is 50 percent more than the Economic Support
Fund and 60 percent more than the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative.48 Of that $4.5 billion,
though, nearly 80 percent goes to two countries, Israel ($2.3 billion) and Egypt ($1.3
billion). Of the remaining 20 percent, just a few countries receive substantial assistance:
Pakistan ($300 million), Jordan ($206 million), and Colombia ($90 million). The
remaining $300 million is shared by sixty-six countries.
In addition to FMF, International Military Education and Training is an important security
cooperation tool that provides training on a grant basis to students from partner coun-
tries.49 The program is funded through the 150 account, but it is implemented by the
Defense Department. From 1997 to 2004, IMET has funded sixty-six thousand participants,
with a notable threefold increase from 1997, when there were 3,454 students, to 11,832 in
2004. Programs include attendance at U.S. professional military education institutions like
the Naval War College, English-language training at the Defense Language Institute, or
training activities like the basic infantry officer’s course. While the training is often well
received, “it is tougher to quantify how such relationships can impact policy issues and ties
between the international community and the U.S. as those students attain higher levels of
responsibility within their government in the succeeding years.”50 Yet General Bantz
Craddock, head of U.S. European Command, testified in 2007, “IMET remains our most
powerful security cooperation tool and proves its long-term value every day.”51 One major
impact of IMET programs is building personal and professional relationships with people
likely to rise to senior levels within their countries. As a testament to the quality of
S H A P I N G T H E S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T 1 1
selections for the Naval War College’s Naval Staff College, for example, 236 participants
have attained flag rank, 102 later served as chiefs of service, five became cabinet ministers,
and one became his nation’s president.52
Regional Security Initiatives
Regional security initiatives are designed to strengthen the stability of partners.53 While
there are many ongoing initiatives, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-
HOA) is increasingly becoming the template. Concern over the growing threat of inter-
national terrorism in the Horn of Africa led in 2002 to the creation of CJTF-HOA “to
prevent conflict, promote regional stability and protect Coalition interests.”54 By conduct-
ing counterterrorism operations, building partner security capacity, and implementing
civic action programs, the CJTF has sought to create an environment that is inhospitable
to terrorist organizations. Rear Admiral James Hart, CJTF-HOA commander, has noted,
“We’re arriving there early enough with an opportunity to help shape the environment,
work towards a more secure environment, and hopefully, to allow people the opportunity
to choose a direction to go in their lives that steers them away from extremism.”55 Rather
than relying on the hard edge of military power and an intrusive American presence,
CJTF-HOA focuses on building schools and hospitals, digging wells, and providing other
humanitarian assistance. These issues are explored by Steve Emerson in chapter 5, where
he argues that “the burden of building political, economic, and social stability in the
Horn needs to pass increasingly to other specialized elements of the U.S. government
with the military moving from a leading to a supporting role.” Thus the challenge
“becomes one of ‘demilitarizing’ and transforming CJTF-HOA into an inter-agency
engagement tool.” While this is widely recognized, deploying sufficient numbers of non-
military personnel from other federal departments has been problematic.
Resistance to Shaping
The growing diplomatic and other nonwarfighting roles of the combatant commanders
have led some critics to worry that the United States has inadvertently created a problem
for itself in the form of a new class of overly powerful and independent military officials,
along the lines of the proconsuls of ancient Rome or the viceroys of British India. It is
difficult to take such concerns too seriously, although a case can certainly be made for
strengthening the civilian and interagency presence and role in COCOM headquarters.
The 1990s “shape-respond-prepare” strategy did give rise to a “superpowers don’t do
windows” argument, particularly within the military. Some identified diplomatic engage-
ment by generals like Wesley Clark (as Supreme Allied Commander Europe), Zinni, or
Charles E. Wilhelm (SOUTHCOM) in the 1990s, or state-building missions in Haiti,
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Bosnia, and Kosovo, as inappropriate and distracting for an organization that is supposed
to fight and win the nation’s wars.
In what was largely a reaction to Clinton-era uses of the military, then presidential can-
didate George W. Bush declared, “I’m not so sure the role of the United States is to go
around the world and say this is the way it’s got to be. We can help. I just don’t think it’s
the role of the United States to walk into a country and say, we do it this way, so should
you.”56 Once elected, the Bush administration attempted to reduce engagement activi-
ties through largely symbolic acts. Engagement was recast as “security cooperation” to
emphasize the security dimension of these activities. Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld purposely set out to reduce the stature of the regional military commanders
by reserving their former title “commander in chief,” or CINC, for the president alone.
These officers accordingly reverted to their designation under Title 10 of the U.S. Code,
“combatant commander,” with an emphasis on the combat role they are supposed to
fill. However, as the engagement mission of combatant commands is institutionalized,
combatant commander may give way to a new title of unified commander to ease con-
cerns about U.S. military involvement around the world.
Some analysts also reacted negatively to what was sometimes cast as postmodern imperial-
ism, a failure in civilian control of the military, or a major problem with the interagency
process. Justin Logan and Christopher Preble found that the United States “has been overly
prone to military intervention, without a proper appreciation of the costs ahead of time.”57
John Hillen raised this concern about fears of overextension: “Most Americans would agree
that the United States must be active in the world, but not so active that the effort wastes
American resources and energies in interventions that yield little or no payoff and under-
mine military preparedness.”58 Andrew Bacevich connected a tendency for the military to
do it all with a disturbing trend within American politics that links “a militaristic cast of
mind with utopian ends,” which leads to an increased propensity to use force.59
Echoing C. Wright Mills’s findings from the 1950s, these and other critics claim Ameri-
can leaders increasingly tend to define international problems as military problems, a
propensity that can preclude nonmilitary solutions.60 For example, U.S. assistance to
Colombia has a decidedly military focus, that of combating the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) insurgency, but it has been criticized by some for lacking
the development assistance needed to reconnect FARC-controlled parts of the country
with the center.61 Again, when in 1999 Slobodan Miloševic´’s Belgrade regime did not
sue for peace after a few days of air strikes meant to end Serb ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo, a protracted air war resulted, with a real potential to develop into a major
ground campaign.62 The learning point, however, is the need to ensure that all elements
of power are synchronized in the most efficient way to achieve the desired outcome. So
S H A P I N G T H E S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T 1 3
far, the data suggest that military-to-military contacts are positively and systematically
associated with liberalizing trends throughout the world;63 improved security in coun-
tries like Colombia have facilitated socioeconomic development.
Inevitably, concern about the nonwarfighting role of the military, which dwarfs other
federal departments, fuels calls for interagency reform. Critics contend that if only the
State Department were on an equal footing with the Defense Department, the United
States would have a more balanced, less belligerent foreign policy. The effects of this
imbalance were recognized by a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report: “As a
result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, U.S. defense agencies are increas-
ingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps.”64
Consequently, the Defense Department runs human rights initiatives and HIV/AIDS
programs and hosts conferences on natural resource management. There is also dispar-
ity with regard to international assistance (the “150 account”). In contrast to public
perceptions, the United States does not dole out suitcases filled with cash to allies;
instead, foreign assistance typically takes the form of American defense goods and ser-
vices (the largest line item is Foreign Military Financing). In spite of calls for budgetary
reform to increase social and economic assistance, Congress simply finds defense issues
more compelling. Politicians have an interest in associating themselves with ideas of
patriotism and strength, so it is much easier to find advocates for exporting attack air-
craft than for women’s empowerment programs. The conventional wisdom on the Hill
indicates that while defense spending is understood by American voters to be a matter
of national security, international assistance spending sounds less urgently important.
In fact, most Americans are not even aware that foreign assistance represents less than
1 percent of the federal budget. The same Senate Foreign Relations Committee report
that expressed caution about military activities in American embassies sees a solution
by placing all security assistance under the authority of the secretary of state;65 further,
it recommends, “ambassadors should be charged with the decision whether to approve
all military-related programs implemented in-country.”66
Mitchell Thompson argues that a remedy for this political and budgetary imbalance
necessarily entails “breaking the proconsulate.” Thompson writes, “Our current geo-
graphic Combatant Commands should be redesigned to break their heavy military ori-
entation, and be transformed into truly interagency organizations, under civilian
leadership, and prepared to conduct the full spectrum of operations using all elements
of national power within their assigned regions.”67 This call is echoed in our current
strategy to combat international terrorism. This document sees the military playing
only a supporting role to other federal departments, which can more appropriately
counter terrorist ideology, interdict terrorist financing, and promote development
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among vulnerable populations—tasks that are not core military functions.68 With the
creation of an interagency-focused AFRICOM and after analysis of SOUTHCOM’s
engagement activities, Thompson’s hypothesis can be tested.
While such reactions have been real and sometimes dramatic, efforts to reduce the
nonwarfighting role of combatant commanders have largely failed. The Bush adminis-
tration could not escape from the reality that there is a global demand for U.S. engage-
ment programs and that the military is the federal department most capable of doing
the engaging. In fact, Congress in the FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act rec-
ognized this: “Civilian agencies of the United States Government lack the capacity to
deploy rapidly, and for sustained periods of time, trained personnel to support . . .
operations in the field.”69 Further, the latest QDR chose “shaping countries at strategic
crossroads” as one of its four focus areas, out of potentially hundreds of possibilities.
Geographic combatant commanders offer the president an important tool of power
that can be exercised in a wide variety of realms: political, economic, military, social,
and informational. If it is important to illustrate national security resolve by deploying
an expeditionary strike group (ESG), that same ESG can deliver humanitarian assis-
tance in stability operations or offer training platforms in shaping operations. Tom
Barnett, for example, has argued the Defense Department must embrace this mission
and develop unique capabilities.70 Additionally, Congress tends to favor the Defense
Department through the appropriations process, and this endowment enables the mili-
tary to conduct engagement activities with little noticeable impact on its ability to con-
duct major combat operations. The Defense Department can and does execute the full
range of military operations. An exercise like COBRA GOLD simultaneously brings the
U.S., Thai, and other regional militaries closer, tests expeditionary warfare concepts,
and implements humanitarian assistance programs.
Setting this aside, the military’s active involvement in diplomacy does not preclude
cooperation with the State Department. In fact, combatant commanders work
extremely closely with their political adviser and the country teams where their engage-
ment programs occur. With time-limited tours of duty, a combatant commander needs
support from outside his military staff. Occasionally, tensions arise having strategic
impact. “Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the
Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effective-
ness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in
Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics, and divisions of labor
are increasingly adjudicated.”71 However, both American ambassadors and combatant
commanders understand that they need each other’s cooperation. If done well, military
shaping activities are coordinated with other interagency activities, beginning at the
S H A P I N G T H E S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T 1 5
national level, where both the State Department and Office of Secretary of Defense
derive priorities and guidance from the national security strategy, which in turn drives
theater security cooperation plans and mission strategic plans.72 Yet an ambassador’s
focus on one country and a combatant commander’s focus on an entire region necessi-
tate coordination. A combatant command can serve as a regional hub of not only coor-
dination but also interagency and combined planning.
Outside the United States, opinion on U.S. engagement is mixed. Majorities in thirteen
out of fifteen publics polled say the United States is “playing the role of world police-
man more than it should be.” This is the sentiment of some three-quarters of those
polled in France (89 percent), Australia (80 percent), China (77 percent), Russia (76
percent), Peru (76 percent), the Palestinian territories (74 percent), and South Korea
(73 percent).73 The data suggest that countries do not necessarily want to be “shaped.”
Ron Ratcliff, in his chapter in this monograph, sees this phenomenon in reaction to the
thousand-ship navy concept: “However logical and benign the thousand-ship navy
seems to the United States, other countries remain openly wary of its intended pur-
poses and possible unintended consequences.”
While negative feedback to American activities is substantial, however, negative reactions
appear to be based on the mode of involvement rather than the involvement itself.74
Publics around the world do not want the United States to withdraw from international
affairs but rather want the United States to participate in a more cooperative and multi-
lateral fashion.75 Majorities in thirteen of fifteen publics polled (Argentines and Palestin-
ians disagreed) support U.S. involvement in a more cooperative and multilateral fashion
through international institutions instead of what they perceive as irresponsible
unilateralism. For its part, the United States has learned that being a superpower does not
make it a superhero that can accomplish anything it desires. Consequently, the nation has
been attempting to coordinate engagement activities to confront transnational security
challenges more effectively instead of trying to provide alone for global security.
A Common Language
I believe if you have these kinds of relationships they would go a long
way to ensuring that we don’t get into a war or get into a fight with peo-
ple that we’re engaged with like this.
ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN, USN
To date, the rationale for shaping as a military activity has been based on the assump-
tion that instability breeds chaos, which would inevitably produce military interven-
tion, and that accordingly the Defense Department should support other countries
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through constructive engagement.76 The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations makes
clear that “in addition to crisis response, the future joint force must be more involved
in proactive engagement/crisis prevention. Peacetime shaping operations might be
aimed at spreading democracy, creating an environment of peace, stability, and good-
will or even aimed at destabilizing a rogue regime.”77 Therefore, the military should
preempt state failure and bolster weak states through regional-level strategies formu-
lated and implemented by geographic combatant commanders. The forthcoming joint
operating concept on shaping emphasizes that a joint force commander must mobilize
and sustain cooperation to achieve common security goals that prevent the rise of
security threats and promote a constructive security environment in the region.78
While nonmilitary agencies like the U.S. Agency for International Development main-
tain the federal government’s core expertise in promoting development, neither it nor
nongovernmental organizations can function in areas lacking security or without ade-
quate resources. Consequently, the military, through geographic combatant commands,
often attempts to build global security through military-to-military contacts, weapons
transfers, and combined training activities. Shaping enhances relationships and
strengthens partners to combat transnational security challenges. Further, since mili-
taries play important roles in many societies, senior American military officers share
with their counterparts a common language, one that is used by the Defense Depart-
ment to create and maintain a global network of military bases essential for shaping
and responding to crises. Essential to shaping are not only interagency coordination
but also international coordination and partnerships. Other countries in the world
have military engagement programs of their own, which may or may not support
American interests. It is critical to understand the extent to which the shaping activities
of the United States and other nations are mutually supporting, overlapping, or
contradictory.
In conclusion, the question is not whether the military should be engaged in
nonwarfighting activities or the shaping mission in particular. Congress and the presi-
dent will almost certainly continue to rely on the military for such missions. Rather,
the issues are how these operations should be structured to ensure unified action by
civilian and military organizations and identify new capabilities that are necessary to
perform these engagement missions efficiently.
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Military Diplomacy
GENERAL TONY ZINNI, U.S. MARINE CORPS (RETIRED)
On 13 August 1997 I became the sixth commander in chief (CINC)* of the U.S. Cen-
tral Command. While I had previously been the command’s deputy and engaged in the
region since 1991, my immediate priority as CINC was to reshape our strategy in light
of our ever-changing area of responsibility and the emerging global strategy of the
Clinton administration. We needed a structure, a strategy, and clear objectives to meet
the many challenges in one of the riskiest parts of the world. Without these, our day-
to-day work would have no focus.
I stepped into my tour as head of Central Command with the knowledge that I was fac-
ing a volatile and crisis-prone part of the world, of vital importance for global energy,
and that the disorder, instabilities, and conflicts in the region were likely to present our
nation with ever more dangerous crises in the near future. The list of security challenges
was long. Iraq had been a running sore since its invasion of Kuwait. Iran had been a run-
ning sore since 1979 and its subsequent war with Iraq. The Taliban was ruling Afghani-
stan. Even then, we were aware that al-Qa‘ida was dangerous, and it was not the only
Islamist organization that gave us concerns. Terrorists in Egypt had recently killed West-
ern tourists. Yemen was trying to stabilize itself after coming out of a terrible civil war
but faced serious frictions with the other countries of the region. There were internal
instabilities in almost every country. And every country had a border dispute with some
neighbor. Somalia remained a failed state. There was an ongoing civil war in Sudan. Ethi-
opia and Eritrea had a longstanding and often violent border dispute. There were border
tensions in the Caspian between the Iranians and the Russians—with oil as the prize.
Pakistan and India remained in conflict, with constant flare-ups over Kashmir. There
were even problems in otherwise idyllic places like the Seychelles, where Asian fishing
fleets were poaching. Everywhere there was smuggling and drug trading; terrorist activ-
ity was increasing. Everywhere I looked I could see dangerous instabilities.
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* Since 24 October 2002, “combatant commander” (CCDR).
In light of these security challenges, I asked myself: “Can I do anything about this?”
Obviously, I had a direct responsibility as commander to manage the conflicts and cri-
ses that might involve our military. Yet, I was also trying to find ways to minimize our
own direct military interventions in these crises. To do this, we had to avoid putting
our own boots on the ground. The simple answer was to prevent crises, but how?
The answer to that question presented an even greater challenge. We had to build order
and stability that might head off conflicts and crises before they hurt us or anybody
else. I started looking at what we could do here to move this crisis-prone region toward
greater stability. We had a choice. We could sit back in a secure location like a fireman,
wait for the alarm, and then rush off to put the fire out. Or we could move into the
neighborhood and locate all the fire hazards and then get rid of them. In short, with a
good engagement strategy, we could head off future crises by building local capacity to
deal with indigenous threats, pursuing regional security initiatives to inspire coopera-
tion throughout the region, and developing trust among U.S. friends and allies through
increased security cooperation activities.
Central Command’s Security Environment
When I assumed command in Tampa, Central Command was responsible for twenty
countries (soon to be twenty-five); it was a diverse region that spanned an area from
East Africa through the Middle East to Southwest and Central Asia and into the Indian
Ocean. Yet the command’s near-total focus was on the Persian Gulf and our long-
standing problems with Iran and Iraq. We were operating under a national security
strategy called “Dual Containment,” whose objective was to protect Gulf energy
resources, contain both Iraq and Iran, and maintain local stability. We were the only
unified command with two major “theater of war” requirements (as we say in the mili-
tary): fight Iraq or fight Iran. These threats were not about to go away during my three-
year tenure, yet other parts of the region were heating up, requiring us to broaden our
focus beyond the Gulf states. Weapons of mass destruction were proliferating all
throughout the region. The Iraqis had used them in the 1980s. The Iranians were
acquiring them. Pakistan and India were in serious conflict over Kashmir, and both
countries were nuclear powers.
Compounding the extant threats, we’d had little recent contact with Iraq, Iran, Afghan-
istan, Sudan, or Somalia. My goal was to change that, and the national security strategy
demanded that shaping activities increase. Developing relationships with Yemen, Ethi-
opia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and the Seychelles required new engagement programs. Long-
standing relationships with Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar,
the United Arab Emirates, and Oman had to be maintained and strengthened. We had
to rebuild our shaky relations with Pakistan. Most of the Muslim states of Central Asia
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that had split off from the Soviet Union—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—were added to Central Command’s area of responsibility.
While the tendency is to lump all of the “stans” together, each had its own special prob-
lems (including a civil war in Tajikistan) and needed its own distinct relationship with
the United States.
Beyond Warfighting
Central Command found itself in a bubbling pot of crises from one end to the other.
We had to develop a theater strategy to handle them without necessarily using military
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force. We needed to help build stability in this troubled region, in my view, or we
would pay the price in the long run.
We were not approaching this process with a blank slate. Since Central Command was
probably the most volatile region in the world, we were starting with thirteen preexist-
ing war plans, an exceptionally large number for a geographic combatant command.
These plans gave us a warfighting orientation that we were well postured to deal with,
thanks to the work of my predecessor, General J. H. Binford (“Binnie”) Peay, U.S.
Army. We now needed to expand and broaden the strategy beyond warfighting. In
order to get a better fix on all the issues, I talked first to my commanders and then
sought input from friendly leaders of the nations in the region and from American
diplomats with expertise in the area, to ensure that we were all working in sync.
For the bigger picture, we turned to President Clinton’s emerging national security
strategy, with its stress on engagement and multilateralism. The military implementa-
tion of this strategy is the job of the secretary of defense, whose national military strat-
egy looks at the national security strategy from a specifically military point of view.
Every four years, the secretary of defense presents to Congress and the president what
is called the “Quadrennial Defense Review” (QDR), which offers still more specifics
about how the military side of defense is going to execute the national security strategy.
It directs the combatant commands to build new strategies for our assigned regions
based on these concepts. The QDR directed the CINCs to “shape, respond, and pre-
pare.” This reflected not only the warfighting responsibilities (respond, prepare) but
the new charge to “shape” our areas of responsibility.
The secretary of defense also directed the CINCs to prepare “theater engagement plans”
for their areas of responsibility. This is our strategy for engaging with the countries with
whom we have relations on a day-to-day basis. Specifically, it is our plan for helping
friendly countries build their militaries, for cultivating and building coalitions for secu-
rity cooperation, and for welding together viable multilateral teams to deal collectively
with the chronic problems we face and to stabilize the region. In other words, it is the
“friendly” side of our overall strategy.
Shifting Gears
The first problem Central Command had to fix was the near-total focus on the Persian
Gulf. To that end, I decided to “subregionalize” our strategy, by breaking the AOR into four
subregions: East Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central and Southwest Asia, and Egypt and Jor-
dan—developing a strategy and programs for each. This approach would ensure that our
Gulf-centric tendency did not detract from the programs and relationships we developed in
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other areas. Though I knew this would not be a clean separation—many interests over-
lapped—I felt we could accommodate that.
Because the nations of each subregion had their own problems, we also had an articu-
lated strategy for each country. In addition, I assigned each of our military components
“focus” countries that fit their capabilities and their compatibility with the militaries of
these nations. This spread the burden and balanced the span of control in managing
our various engagement programs and crisis response requirements.
I then broke down our strategic goals into three areas: warfare, engagement, and devel-
opment. The warfighting goals were designed to have in place the right plans, forces,
and basing options for any possible crisis. We also built a basis for responding to crises
cooperatively with regional allies, through training, exercises, military assistance, intel-
ligence sharing, military schooling, and the like.
Our engagement goals were designed to build strong security relationships and allied
capabilities and to enhance the education of military leaders and familiarize them with
principles and values that drove our military system. Though much of this area was
related to warfighting, it went beyond that to work in cooperative areas that were not
strictly military, such as environmental-security issues and natural-disaster responses.
This built the day-to-day military relationships and capabilities needed to respond to
crises and work as a combined team.
Our development goals were objectives for establishing new relationships, improving
regional stability, and countering emerging threats. They were also related to the develop-
ment of Central Command itself as it evolved to meet future challenges and a changing
defense environment. These were the primary “shaping” efforts directed by the 1997
Quadrennial Defense Review. In designing this ambitious strategy, we cooperated closely
with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and our State Department
partners at embassies throughout the region and at the regional bureaus in State’s Wash-
ington headquarters. Our strategy also reflected ideas contained in the Clinton adminis-
tration’s new global strategy and from my own lifetime of experience in the military, in
conflict resolution, and in peacemaking.
The Clinton strategy represented a significant shift in the way the United States related
to the rest of the world. Though the administration did not always handle this shift as
effectively as it could have, its overall approach was, in my view, correct. Unfortunately,
the Clinton strategy lacked the resources to be implemented fully and effectively, and it
was hampered by competing views of foreign policy—“engaged” or “isolationist.”
The “engaged”—people like Woodrow Wilson, George C. Marshall, and Harry Truman—
believe we can prevent conflicts by actively shaping the environment that produces them,
S H A P I N G T H E S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T 2 7
by directly involving our military, diplomatic, and economic capabilities in the world to
make conditions better, to stabilize the various regions, to build partnerships, and by
doing it collectively—by using the United Nations and regional (or larger) multilateral
coalitions and institutions. In the long run, they see engagement as less costly than any of
the alternatives. Diplomatic solutions are always preferable to military operations.
The “isolationists” fight this view. They see the world as so big, so messy, so out of con-
trol that nobody can fix it. Even if we could help a little here or there, dozens of other
hopeless cases lie festering. And besides, who says we have any responsibility for the
rest of the world anyway? Who made us the policemen of the world? We should be
bringing troops home, not committing them to useless foreign “engagements.” Who
said we have to suffer all the risks and shoulder all the costs of making the world
better? Foreign aid is just another way to throw good money down a bottomless hole.
We could use it better at home tending—and protecting—our own garden. Yes, we
have friends whom we will continue to support. We have interests that we will protect.
But that’s all the involvement in the world that we want or need. During the Clinton
years, Congress generally tended to back the isolationist side and was not supportive of
providing resources for engagement, which defined U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s.
Consequently, the State Department’s resources were cut and the U.S. Information
Agency was collapsed into State; that left the Defense Department in the best fiscal sit-
uation to engage.
Engagement
Engagement was not an airy concept (though many portrayed it that way). It came
with nitty-gritty specifics (though these varied, depending on whether the country in
question was an adversary, a friend, or potentially a friend). We had very formal ways
to “engage” both militarily and diplomatically (the two had to work in tandem). And
we expected these to lead to clear and specific results. Just as the term implies, through
“security assistance” we help other nations improve their security situation by improv-
ing their military and security forces.
Thus when we embarked on a new relationship of engagement (as we did in my time
with the Central Asian states or Yemen), we’d usually begin programs informally, in a
small way, and later we’d make them more formal: put them into one or more of the
categories, set up a program to develop their actual resources, set up and fund joint
training programs, and the like. In other words, engagement might start informally,
but it was expected to grow into a more formal relationship. I felt that if we were more
aggressive and did a better job of planning and coordinating engagement programs—
military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, etc.—we could truly “shape” a more stable,
secure, and productive environment in troubled regions of the world.
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The Clinton administration’s engagement policies had the added effect of building on a
process that the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and the end of the Cold War had already
started—the expansion of the role of the CINCs in their regions. Goldwater-Nichols
gave more power to the CINCs, but primarily as warfighters. By the end of the 1990s,
Goldwater-Nichols had come into bloom: the CINCs had become far more than
warfighters, and the Clinton administration gave the CINCs all around the world a
mission to shape their regions and use multilateral approaches in ways that went
beyond the CINCs’ traditional military role.
This was not simply a wish. The administration strongly promoted and stressed this
change, and its members made very clear that they wanted the CINCs to implement it.
But not everyone welcomed it, including the CINCs themselves. The change came
because there was no other choice. No one else could do the job. My activities and those
of my CINC colleagues are explored in depth in Derek Reveron’s America’s Viceroys.*
What I lived and Reveron documented is the vital role that the military plays in U.S. for-
eign policy, which is much broader than fighting wars.
Importance of Cultural Awareness
My first trips as CINC to the AOR were dedicated to building relationships. I insisted
on taking no issues to the regional leaders on the initial trips (and fought off staff
members with lists of demands, requests, and points to be made). I was not going out
there to talk business. I wanted to listen to the concerns of the people and hear their
views of our role. It was an enlightening experience: meetings with heads of state, such
as President Mubarak of Egypt, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and King Hussein of Jor-
dan, were a novelty for me, but I found it easy to engage these personable leaders.
I found on my journeys that our commitment to stability in the region was widely
appreciated but that our policies and priorities were sometimes questioned. Views of
the threats varied greatly, as did opinions about handling them. The principal com-
plaint was our failure to consult with them not only during but between crises. I found
that cultural awareness was critical to building these relationships.
The Arab world conducts business far more casually than we do or than people do in
Europe, the Pacific, and other places where I’d served. In America or Europe, the meet-
ings are structured. There’s a timetable and an agenda. You limit small talk and feel
guilty when you indulge in it. You tick off items that must be covered. And once they’re
covered, you instantly move on.
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That’s not the way Arabs like to do business. They don’t jump directly into the “big
issues”; they prefer a far more casual mix—and not because they don’t understand the
issues. Rather, it’s the way they connect and take the cut of a man. Personal relations
and trust built out of friendship are more important than just signing paper agree-
ments. They’ll sit around a room and drink coffee, eat some nice food, laugh a little,
and have an easygoing conversation about their families, hunting, the weather, or any-
thing else that doesn’t seem terribly important. In time, they’ll subtly work their way
toward the business at hand and deal with it. But don’t try to rush them. When West-
erners—even CINCs—have tried that, it’s led to problems.
Our way of conducting business just doesn’t work there. When we try it, we’re not well
received. Yet politeness, graciousness, and hospitality are so inbred in Arabs that we
may not recognize that they’ve turned off to us. They will always be polite to guests.
Hospitality is more than just civility in that part of the world; it’s a duty and obligation.
To be inhospitable or impolite is a sin. On the other hand, they really take to people
who like their kind of personal interaction. But doing that right is truly an art—an art
I’ve always enjoyed practicing.
Shaping in Practice
Our day-to-day strategy—what we then called the Theater Engagement Plan—was
supposed to be a theater approach to implementing the Clinton national security strat-
egy (as modified and specified by Secretary of Defense William Cohen in his “shaping
the environment” policy, whose aim was to use our power and influence to bring
nations in our region to greater stability). As our staff went through the process of
developing our plan, it seemed wise indeed to integrate our efforts with the State
Department and other government departments and agencies to bring to bear all the
capabilities of the United States in a focused way to achieve the administration’s goals.
Integration never truly happened. I never found a way to join forces effectively with the
State Department and link their plans with mine. I had no way to get answers to questions
like, What’s the diplomatic component of our strategy? What’s the economic component?
How is aid going to be distributed?
And yet we tried!
Through my superb political adviser and State Department liaison, Ambassador Larry
Pope, I communicated with my counterparts at the State Department, the regional assis-
tant secretaries, and the ambassadors of the countries within Central Command, and I
found kindred souls there. They wanted to cooperate, but I found a tremendous void in
the diplomatic connections in Central Command. There was a void in expanding the
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personal relationships that Generals Hoar* and Peay had worked hard to create. There
was a void in establishing and implementing policy. The void came from several causes.
First, the State Department had not been given the resources it needed to do the job.
The neo-isolationists had cut foreign aid, leaving the State Department without the
wherewithal—the people, the money, the programs—to make the impact it should
have been making. Second, while the end of the Cold War had greatly diminished the
chances of a world-spanning conflict, crises had begun to pop up all over the place; the
military found itself involved in confronting all of them, even those that were not
totally military problems. Finally, the CINCs now had resources the State Department
did not have; the power of the CINCs was now growing (a reality recognized through-
out our region), and they soon became the chief conduits for engagement activities.
Much of what got done was done through the CINCs.
During my time as a CINC, I was asked to carry out presidential and other diplomatic mis-
sions that would normally have fallen to diplomats. I’m sure such things frustrated people
in the State Department, but I don’t think they disapproved. In fact, they were very sup-
portive. It was more a case of, “Well, if we can’t do it, at least somebody is taking care of it. If
it’s the CINCs, then God bless them.” In fact, more often than not, the ambassadors were
very glad we were there. We not only brought them the connections we’d made but pro-
vided them with the ability to get things done they couldn’t ordinarily do.
Like most CINCs, I tried to work very closely with the State Department. In every
country, our ambassador is the president’s representative. I never did anything that an
ambassador did not know of and approve. Moreover, the CINCs often had more per-
sonal presence and far more connections than the ambassadors. In many countries in
Central Command’s region, for example, the senior government leadership is also the
senior military leadership. This is not our system (and the downsides are obvious), yet
the fact had practical consequences. These leaders were more comfortable with soldiers
than with diplomats in many cases.
Anything we did for the ambassadors had to have some military overlap. We couldn’t
simply blatantly set up an aid program. But even here we had some room to maneuver.
In Africa, for example, we might be engaged in teaching a country’s military how to
conduct peacekeeping or humanitarian operations; we might set up training exercises
in the villages. I would send my military veterinarians, dentists, and doctors (who
needed the training anyway) into the villages with the African country’s military, and
they’d conduct the exercises together. In the context of the military exercise, we’d build
S H A P I N G T H E S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T 3 1
* General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, was Commander, U.S. Central Command from 1991 to 1994, when
he was relieved by General Peay.
an orphanage or paint a school or set up a clinic as a civic action project. We’d be pro-
viding our guys with useful training while showing the African troops actually how to
do it; at the same time, we were helping needy people. When the exercises were over, we
would have the American ambassador cut the ribbon for the new clinic. It was impor-
tant, in my mind, always to demonstrate civilian leadership of our military and the
close cooperation between our diplomats and soldiers.
Given the relative frequency of natural disasters in Central Asia and the Near East, we
decided to hold conferences on disaster assistance in some of these countries. The
nations brought their fire, police, emergency service units, and military people; we
brought experts from the United States, who showed them how to intermix the civilian
and military and cooperate with each other—and we did all this in the name of the
American ambassadors. We held other conferences in the region on environmental
security issues, justifying them from the point of view that the military had to be good
stewards of the environment too.
In organizing environmental security conferences, the term “security” was key. An
“environmental” conference on disposal of hazardous waste, for example, would not
have played well back at the Pentagon. We had to have a “military” or “security” con-
nection. Armed with that, we could bring in the Environmental Protection Agency to
talk about how to deal with hazardous waste material. Then I could bring in the
ambassador and expand the conference to other issues, even human rights. (Human
rights issues are very important militarily when you are trying to teach the importance
of “winning hearts and minds” to military forces with no history of these consider-
ations in their operations.)
All of these forms of engagement build strong relationships with countries. They tie in
important military and nonmilitary programs. And from there we are able to move on to
more sophisticated joint training and military assistance projects that promote strong
military-to-military relationships and build better capabilities. Everybody benefits.
In spite of the good work being done in the field, not everybody back home saw things
that way. The struggle went on and on between the longing to lean forward into the
world and do what we could to shape it and the isolationist passion to block all that.
Though I had many disagreements with the Clinton administration, its basic global
strategy was right. I was out in the world and saw the needs, the newly emerging condi-
tions, and how we could help to change them. I also saw that if we failed to change
them, we were doomed to live with the tragic consequences.
The current Bush administration has seriously limited the powers of the CINCs; Secre-
tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who had a passion for centralized control, changed
their name. They are no longer CINCs; they’re just “combatant commanders.” Coming
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into office in 2001 the administration wanted to withdraw America from “nation
building” and other engagement activities, but it soon discovered that there was a seri-
ous demand in the world for U.S. leadership and assistance. Ironically, shaping activi-
ties are more important than ever.
I believe that military force does not solve every problem, nor is it our only form of
national power. There are other kinds of pressure and other kinds of support. In order
to achieve our national goals, we have to combine every capability in our national bag
in the most artful mix possible. But that’s hard when the political infighting spills over
into the implementation end of policy. Even if the CINCs produced good strategies at
their level (and I believe we did), with good ends and reasonable ways to achieve them,
we still had no idea whether or not the administration and the Congress would come
through with the means.
The Washington bureaucracy was too disjointed to make the vision embodied in all the
strategies, from the president’s to the CINCs’, a reality. There was no single authority in
the bureaucracy to coordinate the significant programs we CINCs designed. The uncoor-
dinated funding, policy decisions, authority, geographic assignments, and many other
issues separated State, Defense, Congress, the National Security Council, and other gov-
ernment agencies, making it difficult to pull complex engagement plans together.
Security Cooperation Activities
To implement my security cooperation activities, I had hundreds of military and civil-
ian personnel throughout the region. They coordinated and administered foreign mili-
tary sales, military exercises, military school attendance, training, and other
cooperative efforts with local militaries. Along with the military attachés at American
embassies, they provided the CINCs and diplomats with vital links to local leaders.
They were the day-to-day connections to the local militaries and were an invaluable
means of communication with the military and political leadership in the various
countries. The job they do has never been valued by superiors, and promotions for
those of them in the military have never come easily.
Previously, we had almost always done business with each country individually. I
wanted to change that. I wanted our regional allies to begin to think collectively about
security issues. Since our biggest obstacle was the reluctance of the Arab countries to
embark on a collective security relationship with the United States, I knew it would
take time to develop what I hoped to achieve. Nevertheless, I felt that if I could put
issues of common interest on the table as starting points and get agreement on these,
we’d at least be moving down the right path. I found two such issues: theater missile
defense and environmental security.
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An important element in my developing strategy was to build up the security capabili-
ties of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC—the Gulf regional security coalition of
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait). I knew
this was going to be difficult. Multilateral cooperation did not come easily to the mem-
bers of the GCC. In fact, bilateral cooperation with the United States often came more
easily. That often made us, and not the GCC, the glue in the region. In the long run,
that wasn’t to their advantage or to ours. I hoped to make the GCC the glue and to
move us into a support role.
The slender levels of cooperation in the GCC come out of the historical evolution of
the states, whose development has followed different paths from ours or Europe’s. After
World War II, the United States and Europe were confronted by an expanding and
hungry Soviet Union. Collective security proved to be an effective and lasting counter
to this threat. The American-and-European-designed NATO evolved into the greatest
military coalition in history. The Arab states of the Persian Gulf are not yet ready for
that kind of coalition.
Enlightenment on this subject came to me early in my tour as CENTCOM commander,
during a conversation with an ambassador to the United States from the region. “Why
does the GCC seem unable to turn into a strong regional structure like NATO or the
EU?” I asked him.
“You know,” he explained, “we put on this face of Arab brotherhood and unity. But it’s
only a face. We’re all very different from each other. You have to understand where we
are in our history,” he continued. “You’re expecting us to act like the Europe at the end
of the twentieth century. But that’s not where we are. We’re more like Europe at the
beginning of the twentieth century. We don’t yet have much trust and confidence in
each other.”
He was right. The more time I spent traveling through the nations of the region, the
more I came to understand how remarkably different they are from each other. The
histories of Arab nations after World War II will tell you how difficult it has been to
create an Arab coalition. Powerful, charismatic leaders such as Egypt’s Gamal Abdel
Nasser tried it and failed. The ambassador also made me realize the most important
key to regionalization—that the nations have to be ready for it. There has to be ripe-
ness. Convincing Europe to build a cooperative regional identity and a regional capa-
bility before World War I—or in its aftermath—would have been unthinkable.
Regional coalitions don’t happen just because regionalization is a lovely idea. The nations
have to be ready for it. They’ve got to build it from some small base that doesn’t make any
of them nervous. From this seed, trust and cooperation may grow. If we were going to
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build regional capability, I concluded, we had to lead off with smaller programs that
would build trust.
Surprisingly, and serendipitously, as I was starting to work on these issues the GCC
nations had already begun to resolve some of their long-standing political differences
on their own initiative. A particularly nasty dustup had encouraged the Saudis and the
Yemenis to resolve their border issues; the Yemenis also resolved their border issue with
the Omanis; and Oman, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain put a tense border dispute up for
international arbitration, then accepted the results.
The resolution of these differences ignited momentum for what I planned to do next:
find nonthreatening ways to encourage them to work together and to work with us as a
coherent entity. But my ultimate goal was to shape them into a viable collective security
arrangement. I wanted them to work together for their mutual defense. I wanted them
to exercise together (their combined exercises were that in name only), and I wanted
them to have the same military standards, an integrated command and control system,
and combined and focused capabilities. And when the time came, I wanted their mili-
taries to be able to fight together. In those days they had none of that. Without it they
could not effectively deter or deal with regional hegemons who threaten stability.
I knew I was not going to achieve wonderful results quickly. Attempting that leap in a
single move was never going to work. I had to come up with a program we could
undertake together, that they could collectively support. I wanted an issue on which
there would be no disputes—an issue so benign, so innocuous, so nonthreatening, and
so agreeable that they could not possibly argue over it. And I wanted to give them posi-
tive reasons to work together.
Building Bridges
The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council could not fail to be aware that the
growing missile proliferation in the region was a real problem, and they all knew they
needed a coordinated regional defensive capability to deal with it. We had therefore
proposed that the United States provide the technology and organization skills to pull
it all together, and they had agreed to discuss this at a conference. But first we had to
steer through their instinctive suspicion of our motives. Some saw our proposal as an
attempt to rope them into buying high-cost American systems, while others saw it as a
scheme to pull them into an arrangement that specified a particular enemy. Yet these
suspicions were allayed, and then the conference really took off, especially when we
offered to share early-warning information. This enabled us to build some momentum
in the region on other issues.
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A more promising focus for cooperation, however, was water. Though water sources
are a potential source of conflict in the region, the GCC members have very powerful
incentives to cooperate over that issue. They all take much of their water from the Per-
sian Gulf, and they all depend on desalination plants to make it drinkable. They would
all benefit from cooperating to protect the Gulf. If, for example, the Iranians were ever
to decide to attack the Arabs, one of their first actions would likely be to pollute those
waters and take out the desalination plants. They are strategically vital to the states
along the Gulf.
Once again, my ultimate goal had nothing to do with whether or not the GCC states
cooperated over water. That was the entry point, the easy one, the Coal and Steel Com-
munity that became the European Union. The issue was not water. It was cooperation.
We arranged regional environmental conferences focused on water issues. Representa-
tives from the GCC came, and we brought experts from the EPA and other U.S. agen-
cies. We discussed shared experiences, issues, and problems; we looked at various
capabilities and technologies—developing desalination technology, handling hazard-
ous waste material, monitoring cleanups, taking preventive measures during disposal.
We looked at efforts we could take cooperatively, like combined exercises or coopera-
tive organizations to control and contain oil spills or other contamination. The envi-
ronmental conferences were a great success; the GCC leaders loved them and wanted to
continue them.
Military Diplomacy
While a good strategy shapes the security environment, strategy is also shaped by it. I
was reminded of this by Pakistan’s response to India’s nuclear weapons test. In May
1998, Pakistan was scheduled to test its own nuclear weapon, an act that would drasti-
cally escalate tensions in the region and the world. In an effort to persuade the Paki-
stanis not to test, the State Department planned to send Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbot and the assistant secretary for the region, Rick Inderfer, to meet Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif and other members of the senior Pakistani leadership. I was to
accompany them. The mission was not going to be easy. Relations between the United
States and Pakistan were already tense. The Pakistanis had backed our efforts in
Afghanistan during the Afghan rebellion against the Soviets; there was now a large
number of refugees—as well as a state of chaos—on their western border as a result,
and we had (in their view) dumped them.
The Pakistanis’ bitterness had increased when we imposed sanctions over their weapons
of mass destruction program. Specifically, we had refused to deliver F-16s they had
bought and paid for, or even to return their money; then we’d deducted storage fees for
the planes from what they had paid. No surprise, they were enraged. (The anger was
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compounded after many pilots flying older planes were lost, which wouldn’t have hap-
pened if they’d had the F-16s.) Our treatment of Pakistan was working against our inter-
est. This was a state on the edge; the government was shaky and badly corrupt; and
politically powerful Islamists were inflaming the population. If Pakistan failed or turned
into an Iranian- or Afghan-style theocracy, we would have major problems in the region.
We did not want nuclear-armed Islamist radicals then any more than we do now.
The delegation flew to Tampa to join me on the twenty-two-hour flight to Islamabad. As
we prepared to board the Central Command 707, word came that the Pakistani govern-
ment had decided not to approve the visit. This triggered a flurry of diplomatic calls from
the waiting room at our air base, calls that were made more urgent by the approach of
our drop-dead takeoff time—if we didn’t get in the air within two hours, our crew’s per-
missible flying time would run out.
When the calls kept getting negative results, I proposed to Secretary Talbot a back-
channel approach. If I called General Jehangir Karamat, the chief of staff of Pakistan’s
military, I thought he would okay the trip. Karamat was a man of great honor and
integrity, and a friend. Relations with Pakistan hung on the thin thread of a personal
relationship that General Karamat and I had agreed to maintain.
“Go ahead,” the secretary told me, though his face was skeptical. But when I called Gen-
eral Karamat, he promised to take care of the problem; a few minutes later we were in the
air—further proof, if the secretary needed it, that the relationship between our two mili-
taries remained strong, in spite of the strained relationships elsewhere. Though Washing-
ton had severely limited the military-to-military connections I could make, the personal
connection to General Karamat I had insisted on maintaining now proved its worth.
In Pakistan, we met several times with Prime Minister Sharif and his ministers but were
unable to convince them not to test. The domestic pressure to respond to the Indian tests
was too great. As we left, I had a few private moments with General Karamat, who shared
with me his frustration with his corrupt government. Pakistan’s military leaders had
more than once seized power from the elected government. Though others in the mili-
tary had urged him to follow that tradition now, he assured me he could never do that.
He kept his word, but that did not stop a military coup later that year.
Round Two
At the end of July, on another trip to Pakistan, I visited some of the more remote and
rugged parts of the country—the Line of Control Area of Kashmir, the nearby Siachen
Glacier, and the fabled Khyber Pass, on the western border with Afghanistan. In these
wild mountains, Pakistani and Indian troops had faced off against each other for decades
at altitudes in excess of twenty thousand feet. If the fighting didn’t kill you, the weather
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and altitude would. To my surprise, the two countries had, for the most part, succeeded
in containing the fighting to this dangerous and volatile, yet well defined, area. But that
“happy” situation was going to change in a matter of months.
In May, Pakistani forces made a deep incursion into an area called Kargil on the Indian side
of the Line of Control. Though there was normally “fighting” near the Line of Control, the
area for a long time had been quite stable. There’d be probes and shooting during the good
months of the year, but nothing ever changed much; in wintertime everybody would pull
back down into the valleys, and the two sides would create a “no-man’s-land.” As spring
came, they’d go back up into their positions.
Every so often, somebody on one side would be a little late getting up to their spring
position, and the other side could grab an advantage of a kilometer or so. It was like
“Aha, I’ve gotcha!” on a tactical level. But it didn’t really change things. This time, how-
ever, the Pakistanis waylaid the Indians and penetrated all the way to Kargil. This was
such a deep, significant penetration that it went beyond the tactical; it threatened
Indian lines of communication and support up to Siachen Glacier.
The Indians came back with a vengeance. There were exchanges of fire; there was a
mobilization of forces; there were bombing attacks; and planes were shot down. Then
the two sides started to mobilize all their forces all along the line; it was beginning to
look like the opening moves of a larger war. It got alarming.
I was therefore directed by the Clinton administration to head a presidential mission to
Pakistan to convince Prime Minister Sharif and General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of
Army Staff, to withdraw their forces from Kargil. I met with the Pakistani leaders in
Islamabad on 24 and 25 June and put forth a simple rationale for withdrawing: “If you
don’t pull back, you’re going to bring war and nuclear annihilation down on your coun-
try. That’s going to be very bad news for everybody.” Nobody actually quarreled with this
rationale. The problem for the Pakistani leadership was the apparent national loss of face.
Backing down and pulling back to the Line of Control looked like political suicide. We
needed to come up with a face-saving way out of this mess. What we were able to offer
was a meeting with President Clinton, which would end the isolation that had long been
the state of affairs between our two countries, but we would announce the meeting only
after a withdrawal of forces.
That got Musharraf ’s attention; and he encouraged the prime minister to hear me out.
Sharif was reluctant to withdraw before the meeting with Clinton was announced
(again, his problem was maintaining face), but I insisted; he finally came around and
ordered the withdrawal. We set up a meeting with Clinton in July.
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Round Three
In October 1999, the tension between the civilian and military leadership of Pakistan
finally came to a head. The government was freely elected but outrageously corrupt. The
military found itself between a rock and a hard place. If it let the situation continue, the
rot could grow bad enough that the country would collapse—a very real possibility. But
there was no way to change this situation by the normal liberal democratic rules.
Sharif set in motion his own downfall by trying to fire General Musharraf, while
Musharraf was out of the country, and putting the chief of intelligence in his place. He
had originally given Musharraf the job as head of the army under the misperception that
Musharraf would be easy to control. He had not reckoned on the general’s integrity.
In response to Sharif ’s move, the Pakistani army executed a coup. The coup was
moving to its climax as Musharraf was flying home; for him, success was to be a very
near thing. His aircraft came back into the country low on fuel; the airports, still
under the control of Sharif ’s forces, were closed to him. At the last possible moment,
forces friendly to Musharraf took over an airport, and the general landed. Prime
Minister Sharif was soon placed under arrest, and Musharraf declared his intent to
clean up governmental corruption and install true democracy.
The coup did not play well in Washington, and I was ordered to cease communications
with General Musharraf. Though I thought the order was stupid, I complied. But the
following month, while in a reviewing stand in Egypt during Exercise BRIGHT STAR, I
received a call from General Musharraf. Since Secretary Cohen was near me, I asked
what he wanted me to do. He said, “Take the call, but don’t make any commitments.”
It was a personal call between friends, Musharraf explained (though, of course, we
both knew that any conversation would have wider ramifications). He wanted me to
know what had led to the coup and why he and the other military leaders had had no
other choice. The point he made then was a powerful one: “Democracy and the bal-
lot are both a sham when any government that results can offer everything they con-
trol up for sale. We’ve had a democracy of form, and not a democracy of substance. I
want democracy in substance, I’ll work for that, no matter what it costs me. And
there’s one more thing I have to make clear,” he told me. “I don’t care what most oth-
ers think about my motivations or intentions, but it’s important to me that you know
what they are.”
I thanked him for his candor and wished him well. When I briefed Cohen on the call, I
made clear that it was more important than ever to stay connected to Pakistan. He
understood what I was saying, but he didn’t think Washington would be convinced.
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Round Four
In December, Jordanian intelligence uncovered a massive plot to kill American tourists
at the turn-of-millennium celebrations in Jordan and throughout the Middle East. The
captured terrorists, who had links to Osama Bin Laden, revealed that their immediate
leaders were in Pakistan.
Calls soon came from the State Department and National Security Council: “Please call
Musharraf and ask him to help.” And I did.
In response to my requests, Musharraf arrested the terrorists (giving us access to them
and to their confiscated computer disks) and threw in several other favors.
“Now do something for Musharraf,” I told Washington. “Or at least let us reconnect.”
The answer was no; I called Musharraf and told him how disappointed I was.
I told him, “I know what courage it took to do what you did for us. So it’s doubly
embarrassing for me that I can’t give you anything in return.”
“I don’t want or expect anything for what I’ve done,” Musharraf replied. “Tony, I did it
because it was the right thing to do.”
Incompatible Cultural Prisms
As my experiences throughout the region in general and with Musharraf in particular
illustrate, I did not intend to sit back and say, “Hey, my job is purely military. When
you’re ready to send me in, coach, that’s when I go in.” When I assumed command of
CENTCOM and had the ability to choose between fighting fires or preventing them, I
chose prevention. If there was any possible way to make this a less crisis-prone, more
secure and stable region, I wanted to try it, through shaping operations.
I recognized that no single nation in the region was capable of coping with its instabili-
ties. But could we create regional capabilities to cope with them? That is, could we
build and support regional coalitions of friendly nations who could cooperatively take
on local instabilities? Since it would be their commitment to building stability, they
would own it and feel responsible for it. And since they were not outsiders in the
region (as we were), there would be greater acceptance of their presence. Obviously,
they would need our help. Whatever we invested in these projects would pay off later in
regional stability, order, and peace. It was far better to invest a little now than pay a lot
later to end a crisis.
The Central Command experience taught me a lot about the world and the role of our
great nation in it. We could make a difference if we were committed to standing up to our
obligations, not only as the last remaining superpower but also as the last beacon of hope
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for many people on this planet. But what is necessary to understand is that no place on
earth has simple problems that lend themselves to simple solutions. The skillful blending
and application of all our elements of national power, the cooperative participation of
partners in implementation, and the full understanding of the complexities and nuances
of the situation are absolutely necessary to putting together the right policies and pro-
grams and, most importantly, to implementing them effectively. Too frequently we have
applied simplistic and ad hoc approaches to complex problems.
Deeper understanding of our place in the international order, our partners, and the
world is necessary. Achieving stability and improving national security is not a simple
matter of building capacity. Rather, we need to find mechanisms like shaping to reduce
friction, which comes from distrust, fear, or uncertainty. Those with a vested interest in
the status quo or in other outcomes will resist change. Yet, the strongest resistance nor-
mally originates in the cultural differences that create seemingly incompatible prisms
through which the various parties see the issues. Culture is formed by history and
geography; it generates the customs, beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a soci-
ety. Too often, we fail to analyze and understand these factors. Instead, we use our own
cultural prisms to determine how things should be done and in what order. We use
them to assume superiority and rightness in all issues. We use them to stereotype and
generalize. At best, this failure causes us serious problems in the world. At worst, it
leads to conflict, chaos, and war.
In spite of this, forty years as a Marine taught me that the only place to be is in the cen-
ter of the arena. You get knocked down, and you make mistakes. But you also realize
that it sure beats sitting in the grandstands criticizing those who have the guts to be out
there, and every once in a while you can make a difference—and we must make a dif-
ference. America has to lead. We have no choice. We’re the eight-hundred-pound
gorilla in an eight-by-ten room. We may not like being in this position, and we may
wish we didn’t make everybody else in the room nervous, but we can’t help being who
we are. But by shaping operations we can decrease tensions around the world, build
trust among neighbors, and create the conditions to reduce conflict.
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Maritime Security Cooperation
COMMANDER ALAN LEE BOYER, U.S. NAVY (RETIRED)
Our job is to promote peace and stability through maritime partnerships
and deny violent extremists or rogue nations the opportunity to strike.
ADMIRAL HARRY G. ULRICH, USN
Prior to 2004, shaping activities carried out by American naval forces in the Mediterra-
nean and the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) consisted mainly of presence and military diplo-
macy.1 Presence in the Mediterranean was performed primarily by the Sixth Fleet
command ship, USS La Salle (AGF 3), stationed in Gaeta, Italy; the submarine tender
USS Emory S. Land (AS 39) in La Maddalena, Italy; and typically a destroyer on a six-
month deployment assigned to Commander, Task Force 60 (CTF 60). Other naval
forces would deploy to the region for operations and training exercises for shorter peri-
ods of time, usually as part of their transits to and from the Arabian Gulf. No perma-
nent presence was maintained in the Gulf of Guinea. Naval security cooperation was
largely carried out through regular port visits in the Mediterranean and other related
activities by the Sixth Fleet staff members embarked on La Salle. This was supple-
mented with port calls by the CTF 60 destroyer and transiting ships. GOG naval diplo-
macy was limited to the participation of one or two ships in the biannual West Africa
Training Cruise and infrequent short port visits by single surface combatants deployed
to the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility.2 The dominant focus was not shaping but the
conduct of and planning for war and contingencies in the Balkans and Afghanistan.
Since 2004, the focus of Commander Naval Forces Europe–Commander Sixth Fleet
(CNE-C6F) has shifted from defense to security-related activities aimed at fostering
maritime safety and security. Its operational concept now relies on shaping operations
designed to build partner capabilities and capacity to respond to maritime security
threats and challenges. Its operational focus has also changed, from Northern and
Western Europe toward the east and south.3
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This chapter will examine Mediterranean and GOG threats and challenges, strategic objec-
tives, CNE-C6F’s operational concept, and the ways and tools that command uses to con-
duct shaping operations. It will conclude with a discussion of implications for the future.
Threats and Challenges
Since the end of the Cold War, the way European Command (EUCOM) and CNE-C6F
understand security has shifted, due to globalization and the demise of great-power
competition in Europe. Emerging threats, often from transnational actors and weak
states, have become increasingly important concerns. In March 2005, General James L.
Jones, the EUCOM commander, described the changed security environment in this
way: “The new security menace is transnational and characterized by enemies without
territory, borders, or fixed bases. Threats include the export and franchising of terror-
ism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking, uncontrolled ref-
ugee flow, illegal immigration and piracy on the seas.”4 Admiral Harry G. Ulrich,
commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, has similarly identified illegal fishing and the
illegal siphoning off and transporting of fuel, environmental degradation, smuggling,
piracy, proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illegal actions as major threats in the
GOG. 5 The most significant maritime threats include piracy, pollution, illegal fishing,
and trafficking in drugs, people, and weapons. Local and transnational criminal groups
account for most illegal activities; however, private citizens and business interests also
engage in illegal actions that threaten economic stability and security.
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MAP 1
Gulf of Guinea
Terrorism and Armed Groups
Maritime terrorist attacks have been rare in CNE-C6F’s area of responsibility, yet terror-
ists have been active in the Mediterranean. Such groups as the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK), Hezbollah, and Hamas have used the sea to channel funds and materiel for opera-
tions in Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, and the Palestinian territories. In 2001 al-Qa‘ida used
the Mediterranean to support operations ashore and planned attacks on ships in the
Mediterranean.6 Today, in addition to al-Qa‘ida, several other terrorist groups are active
in North Africa, although none has demonstrated a maritime capability.
In the Gulf of Guinea, transnational terrorism identified with Islamic extremists is not
the threat;7 instead, the threat is from local armed groups seeking concessions from
national governments.8 These groups are most active in the Niger Delta region of Nige-
ria.9 Groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta have engaged
in a number of such illicit activities as kidnapping, illegal oil bunkering, oil infrastruc-
ture sabotage, and attacks on security forces. Their demands have included the
“creation of additional states for Ijaws [a collection of subgroups indigenous to the
delta region], amenities and jobs for rural communities, contracts and oil concessions
for faction leaders and even calls for independence.”10 Nigeria’s inability to govern the
Niger Delta has effectively created an ungoverned zone where armed groups can flour-
ish. A major concern of military planners is that such ungoverned areas could
destabilize the region and become havens for transnational terrorists.11
Illicit Activities
Immigration and Human Trafficking. A major humanitarian, economic, and security
challenge for both regions, particularly the Mediterranean, is the movement of people.
Every year, hundreds of millions pass through the Mediterranean’s ports.12 Most are
legal travelers, but hundreds of thousands attempt to cross borders illegally. Most origi-
nate from sub-Saharan Africa, but they also come from Asia, the Maghreb,* Syria,
Libya, Egypt, Palestine, and India. The major transit routes are across the Strait of
Gibraltar; from Libya, Tunisia, Albania, and the Balkans to Italy; and from the Canary
Islands to Spain. Several thousand vessels smuggle illegals across the Mediterranean
each year.13 People seeking illegal passage reportedly pay between two and six thousand
euros to cross the Mediterranean from North Africa.14 Transporters range from small-
time operators in the west to transnational criminal networks in the east. Terrorist
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* Traditionally northwestern coastal Africa, centered on the Atlas Mountains; the Arab Maghreb
Union, formed in 1989, comprises Morocco (which has annexed Western Sahara), Algeria, Tunisia,
Libya, and Mauritania.
organizations like the PKK and al-Qa‘ida reportedly engage in human trafficking to
fund their primary operations.15
The magnitude of maritime human trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea is significantly
less than in the Mediterranean. Most human trafficking in the Gulf occurs on land and
stays within the region—except for Nigeria and Togo, from where women and children
are trafficked to Europe. The GOG state most concerned about maritime illegal immi-
gration is Gabon, which considers this its most significant maritime threat.16
Illicit Trafficking of Drugs and Conventional Weapons. Although ever increasing in
scale, the maritime aspect of illicit drug and weapons trafficking in the GOG is rela-
tively small. For Mediterranean states, drugs and weapons are significant problems.
Europe consumes approximately 33 percent of the world’s illicit drugs.17 Some, like
cocaine or heroin, are transported by sea from other parts of the globe, which is one of
the most important activities of organized crime groups and networks in Europe.
While this is not yet the case for criminal groups operating in the GOG, that may be
changing. Recent seizures in Ghana, Guinea, and Nigeria of cocaine bound for the
United States indicate the presence of European and Latin American criminal networks
in Western Africa. The region may be becoming not just a transit area but a “stockpil-
ing logistics base for drug trafficking.”18
The Mediterranean too has a long history of trafficking in weapons and explosives.
Recently, most of this activity has occurred in the eastern Mediterranean, due to armed
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Mediterranean
conflicts in the Balkans and the Palestinian territories, perpetrated by small freelancers
as well as larger and more sophisticated transnational criminal organizations and ter-
rorist groups.19 Evidence of illicit weapons trading includes maritime seizures of assault
rifles, explosives, and detonators on board internationally flagged vessels.
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). A major security objective for
the United States and its Mediterranean partners is nonproliferation. In the maritime
domain, the problem has two dimensions. First, hostile nonstate actors may exploit the
sea to transport WMD for use against the United States and its allies.20 Second, states
and entities acting under state cover could use the sea to transport WMD materials.
For Gulf of Guinea states, WMD proliferation is less of a concern.
Environmental Degradation. A more significant threat to the economic and social
health of GOG states arises from environmental degradation caused by lawlessness at
sea due to these states’ inability to monitor and control effectively their coastal waters
and exclusive economic zones. Poaching by Asian, European, and other African vessels
is estimated to cost the region $370 million annually.21 Angola lost 19.3 percent of its
catch value in 2004 due to unreported and unregulated fishing.22 Other factors contrib-
uting to environmental degradation are gas flaring, toxic waste dumping, uncontrolled
discharge of human and domestic waste into the ocean, and coastal erosion.
Eutrophication (overenrichment of nutrients) and oxygen depletion of water, particu-
larly around the urban areas, have resulted in decreased fish levels and an increase of
waterborne diseases.
Piracy and Illegal Oil Bunkering. The two remaining threats found in the Gulf (though
not in the Mediterranean) are piracy and illegal oil bunkering. Thirty-two of 239 (13
percent) of the world’s maritime armed robberies and piracy attacks in 2006 occurred
in the GOG. Nigeria experienced the third-highest number of attacks and the most
maritime kidnappings.23 Illegal oil bunkering is also a significant problem in the GOG.
Experts estimate from seventy thousand to three hundred thousand barrels per day are
bunkered illegally in Nigeria.24 The money funds local armed groups, criminal syndi-
cates, and corrupt government officials, which decreases the revenue available to
national governments to finance development in health, education, or infrastructure.
Challenges
The two most significant strategic challenges that impact shaping operations are globaliza-
tion and governance at the national and regional levels. As Admiral Ulrich asserts, “global-
ization has connected us.”25 The speed and number of ways in which people interact is
changing due to globalization flows (information, technology, goods, people, and ideas),
and globalization continues to change the nature of the operational space in which
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planners and practitioners conduct their shaping activities. Recent manifestations include
the continued evolution of a just-in-time global supply chain, seaborne trade, and the pro-
liferation of Internet and cellular telephone–based information technologies.26
While globalization undergirds the security environment, however, a more important
factor is governance. The quality of governance at the national and regional levels
directly relates to political will, capacity, and capability to respond to security chal-
lenges; to resource availability; and to the ability to cooperate and form partnerships.
Governance as measured by the World Bank’s six “worldwide governance indicators”
shows that European partners (France, Spain, United Kingdom, Italy, Portugal) and
Israel (except in the “political stability/no violence” indicator) generally score in the
top 25th percentile. North African countries’ scores, while they vary considerably, on
average fall into the lower end of the middle percentiles (25th to 75th). In the GOG,
most states score in the bottom percentile in almost all indicators, except for Ghana,
which on average scores higher (between 45th and 59th on all indicators) than any
North African state.27
Numerous reasons exist for the poorer governance in the Gulf of Guinea and North
Africa. A significant cause, especially in the GOG, is corruption. With the exception of
Ghana, all the GOG states’ scores on the World Bank’s corruption index are under 30.
Corruption, weakness of institutions, and lack of resources make it very difficult for
these states to find and sustain the political will needed to effect change.28
Without that political will, countries are unable or unwilling to build effective institu-
tions, sustain domestic, regional, or interagency cooperation, or enforce domestic and
international laws. The United States and its European partners generally have sufficient
political will in this respect, as manifested by relatively high levels of maritime coopera-
tion, improved interoperability, and shared awareness of maritime threats. Tangible evi-
dence of this political will is seen in the U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security and a
major new European Union (EU) maritime policy paper.29 Less political will has histori-
cally been present in North African states; however, a change over the last several years is
evident in improved information sharing with NATO, improved interoperability, and
increased patrolling of maritime zones. In the GOG, political will is weak or often absent,
especially regarding maritime safety and security. This lack of will also results in poor
maritime threat awareness, land-centric approaches to policy, and the overwhelming of
government authorities by the magnitude of maritime security challenges.30
Strategic Objectives and Requirements
The strategic requirements that CNE-C6F’s shaping activities must meet are fourfold.
The first requirement is to prevent the maritime domain from being used by terrorists,
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criminals, or hostile states to harm the United States, its people, economy, property, allies,
or friends.31 Strengthening allies and partners is the second requirement.32 The third is to
defend the United States forward—that is, to prevent enemies from attacking the home-
land by defeating them overseas.33 The final requirement is to expand peace and prosper-
ity to Eastern Europe and Africa.34 According to the EUCOM Maritime Security Strategy
for Africa, this last requirement cannot occur if the maritime domain is ungoverned.
Therefore, if CNE-C6F can help Gulf of Guinea states secure their natural resources, their
governments “could begin to move away from their present status as aid recipients; and
instead could begin to address poverty, hunger, and security issues themselves.”35 Essen-
tially, the overarching security objective for CNE-C6F is to improve significantly mari-
time security in its area of responsibility by building partnerships and partner capacity to
deal with maritime threats—both key “tier two” joint capability areas (see chapter 1).
CNE-C6F Operational Concept
The approach Commander Naval Forces Europe–Commander Sixth Fleet has adopted
to advance peace and stability in its area of responsibility is based on creating maritime
safety and security. At the March 2006 Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of
Guinea Workshop, in Accra, Ghana, Admiral Ulrich summed up the ideas behind
CNE-C6F’s concepts with three points: “First, that maritime safety and security are
vital for economic development and human security. Second, maritime safety and
security requires maritime domain awareness. Lastly, it is impossible to have maritime
safety and security without multinational cooperation.”36
CNE-C6F is attempting to take a more comprehensive and sustainable approach to
maritime safety and security. Unlike in the past, the current concept relies heavily on
shaping activities and supports a long-term focus. The stated timeline for the GOG is
ten years, although CNE-C6F planners acknowledge that in fact it will likely be a gen-
erational or a multigenerational effort.
The ways employed are generally pragmatic in nature due to the challenges and partners
involved. The main methods include theater security cooperation (TSC), the leveraging
of operations and security arrangements to improve cooperation in order to combat ter-
rorism and other illicit activities at or from the sea, improvement in awareness, and the
sharing of information. By capitalizing upon security frameworks such as NATO’s Part-
nership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue, and bilateral arrangements, CNE-C6F
is attempting to build on past cooperation and common interests.37
Two tenets guide CNE-C6F’s shaping efforts. First, the staff believes, solutions should
be based on regional and national needs and contexts. Experience has taught CNE-C6F
planners that the best solutions are ones that each nation and region develops on its
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own. By making support available, CNE-C6F believes, it has a better chance of allowing
local “ownership” and of creating long-term sustainability. Second, activities should
support and facilitate action across the full spectrum of diplomatic, informational,
military, and economic power. Unity of effort and cooperation with interagency, inter-
governmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) part-
ners should be fostered whenever possible. CNE-C6F views maritime forces collectively
as a tool that should support partner efforts to improve underlying conditions in both
the Gulf and the Mediterranean.
Shaping Tools
Differing capabilities of CNE-C6F partners determine the tools the command uses in
each instance of its engagement activities. In the Gulf, shaping tools focus primarily on
building awareness of the need for maritime safety and security. Efforts to build capac-
ity and capability to deal with and respond to maritime threats and challenges are still
in their infancy in the region. In the Mediterranean, due to the existence of the EU,
NATO, and other such capable partners, shaping tools focus on the full range of mari-
time security activities, ranging from awareness to information sharing and response-
force capabilities.
Mediterranean Shaping Tools
One of the main tools CNE-C6F and its NATO partners use for shaping is Operation
ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE). NATO launched OAE in October 2001 under Article V of the
Washington Treaty as a part of its response to the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks in
the United States.38 OAE’s stated purpose was to detect, deter, and protect against terrorist
activity. Initially, ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR focused on naval presence and surveillance opera-
tions in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Since then, the North Atlantic Council has
expanded the geographic and operational scope of OAE three times. ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR
forces are used for the following tasks: helping deter and disrupt support to terrorism at or
from the sea; controlling choke points—the most important passages and harbors—by
deploying minehunters from standing NATO mine countermeasures groups to carry out
preparatory route surveys; providing escorts through the Strait of Gibraltar when neces-
sary; and enhancing the Mediterranean Dialogue and other NATO programs to promote
bilateral and multilateral relations.39
Approximately a dozen ships from NATO navies are typically assigned to Joint Task
Force Endeavour. This dedicated force gives NATO a visible presence at sea to deter ter-
rorism and other illicit activities in the sea lanes and to react to a broad range of con-
tingencies, including search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.40
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In addition, the operation also improves interoperability, builds capacity, and generates
cooperation and information sharing.
At the strategic level, NATO also uses ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR as a vehicle for political
engagement with non-NATO states. The June 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul invited
non-NATO countries (among them Russia, Ukraine, and Mediterranean Dialogue
countries) to participate in OAE. Since then, Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Israel, Algeria,
Morocco, Tunisia, Albania, Croatia, Sweden, and Finland have expressed interest in
joining the operation on some level. Categories of participation include political dis-
cussion and intelligence sharing as well as providing forces. Of the Mediterranean Dia-
logue countries, Israel and Morocco have been the most active. At a 7 April 2006
meeting in Rabat between NATO and its seven Mediterranean partners, Algeria, Israel,
and Morocco agreed to join in naval counterterrorism patrols.
An OAE-affiliated undertaking is Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY (OBSH), launched
on 1 March 2004 by the Turkish navy. The objective is to ensure the “smooth flow of
shipping through the Turkish straits as well as maintaining navigational order along
the vital sea lines of communication in the Black Sea maritime domain” until a Black
Sea Force is able to assume this and other maritime security duties on a permanent
basis.41 In this venue the United States is able to leverage its NATO relationship with
Turkey to obtain more information on Black Sea traffic before it arrives in the Mediter-
ranean. NATO also takes advantage of OBSH as a way to build capacity within regional
navies (including those of Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine).
Gulf of Guinea Shaping Tools
Building a culture of maritime safety and security is significantly more challenging in
the GOG than in the Mediterranean, due to the former’s limited maritime domain
awareness, capacity, and capabilities. A major reason for that lack, in turn, is an absence
of political will at the national level. In an effort to cultivate political will for maritime
safety and security, CNE-C6F initiated a series of high-level regional flag officer visits,
workshops, and symposiums. The first event was the 2006 Maritime Safety and Secu-
rity in the Gulf of Guinea Workshop mentioned above. This workshop brought
together eighty African, American, and European officials and officers to discuss and
analyze maritime security challenges in the region. The Accra workshop was used to
generate interest in and set the stage for a ministerial conference.
That ministerial conference, held in November 2006 in Cotonou, Benin, brought
together government ministers, high-ranking naval officers, and members of the IGO
and NGO communities to discuss maritime threats and challenges, maritime domain
awareness, regional approaches to cooperation, legal and regulatory regimes, public
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awareness, and political will. The final products of the conference, the Communiqué of
the Gulf of Guinea and Action Plan for Communiqué, reflect the priorities, experiences,
and needs of GOG states. They were a clear expression of the determination of the
attending ministers and government representatives to work together to improve mari-
time governance in the region. The action plan laid out six major objectives, as well as
timing and required actions.42
The purpose of this conference and the diplomatic activities leading up to it were to
raise awareness among key institutions and policy makers in Gulf of Guinea countries
of the importance of the maritime domain to the economic development and stability
of the region, which would in turn lead to greater political will for action and ulti-
mately generate maritime safety and security capacity and capabilities. Whether GOG
leaders develop the political will to work together on strategies, plans, and maritime
capabilities is an open question; however, it appears the objective of raising awareness
has been at least partially met.
The Accra workshop and Cotonou Ministerial Conference were both considered suc-
cessful in that the outputs were not driven by the United States or its European part-
ners but by the GOG participants. CNE-C6F and its partners acted as facilitators and
consultants. They provided a framework, not a solution; they helped their regional
partners develop their own solution, based on local circumstances. An additional
example of this approach has occurred in Ghana. CNE-C6F planners have been con-
sulting with Ghanaian officials on their country’s new national strategy for maritime
security, helping the Ghanaians use their own information and ideas to craft a strategy
themselves. The bilateral engagement strategy used in Ghana is consistent with CNE-
C6F’s overall approach to the region. It attempts to generate maritime safety and secu-
rity by taking a top-down view, based on the belief that the GOG’s political ills are such
that success is not possible unless senior leadership buys into the process. This
approach is different from the one pursued in the Mediterranean; there the approach is
much less top down.
To go beyond awareness of maritime challenges and the development of limited capac-
ity, CNE-C6F is attempting two initiatives in the Gulf. The first, the Maritime Safety
and Security Information System (MSSIS), also being used in the Mediterranean, is a
multilateral, unclassified, maritime domain awareness (MDA) network developed with
the assistance of the Department of Transportation’s Volpe Center. The goal of the
MSSIS is to create a comprehensive operational picture by integrating data from vessels
equipped with the Automated Identification System (AIS) and other commercial data
streams into American, NATO, and partner C4I* systems.43 MSSIS was allocated $2.6
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* Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence.
million in fiscal year 2006 for twenty-one African states. The first GOG countries par-
ticipating in MSSIS are Ghana, São Tomé and Principe.
The second initiative, the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC), is a joint
capability technology demonstration (JCTD) initiated in 2006, designed to enable
select nations in the Gulf to develop MDA in regional waters and share their data with
each other and with the United States. Nigeria and the island nation of São Tomé and
Principe will be the first countries to receive training, sensors, and processors under
this JCTD. Site surveys and additional system installations are planned for the remain-
der of fiscal year 2007. In fiscal year 2008, an additional $540,000 is planned to support
a site survey in Nigeria.
A subordinate concept CNE-C6F has developed for the GOG is the Global Fleet Station
(GFS) concept. A GFS is an instrument used to carry out theater security cooperation
activities and to build relationships; the concept is an outgrowth of the realization that
building partner capacity requires a sustained presence that brief ship visits cannot
provide. When the first GFS arrives in the Gulf of Guinea in late 2007, it will have an
international staff embarked and stay in the Gulf for approximately six months, mak-
ing regular port calls in the region in a continuous loop. It will provide training to
GOG nations based on their requests.
In the past, when CNE-C6F sent ships to the GOG for extended periods of time, the
advance planning that governed their deployments was largely developed by the CNE-
C6F staff itself. With the Global Fleet Station, this is no longer the case. The GFS staff
started advance planning by asking Gulf states and other partners what they would like
the GFS to do, based on their needs and objectives. By making GFS advance planning a
TSC activity, the staff is attempting to generate local consensus and serve local needs,
an effort that will enhance American legitimacy in the region.
Leveraging existing partnerships and building new ones with key European states,
IGOs, NGOs, and the interagency realm is the last major shaping tool utilized in the
GOG. The primary European states involved in TSC activities with CNE-C6F are the
United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Portugal. So far they have attended workshops
and conferences and provided observers. They are expected to provide liaison officers
and trainers on the first GFS. France too conducts bilateral TSC activities (ship visits,
training exercises, maritime protection activities, etc.) with countries in the region. The
Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Norway have recently expressed interest in participat-
ing in theater security cooperation with CNE-C6F.
IGOs and NGOs have been limited in cooperation and participation with CNE-C6F.
The active participation of the International Maritime Organization and the Maritime
Organization for West and Central Africa in the Accra workshop and Cotonou
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conference helped give legitimacy to CNE-C6F’s awareness-building effort by showing
Gulf officials that CNE-C6F’s ideas on how to deal with maritime challenges are famil-
iar. Other recent outreach attempts with IGOs and NGOs, such as the Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations and InterAction (the largest alliance of
U.S.-based international development and humanitarian NGOs), have been less suc-
cessful, due to unfamiliarity with and concern over the U.S. military’s motives. This
same problem also exists with some of CNE-C6F’s interagency partners. With both
groups, CNE-C6F is still in the relationship-building phase, working to improve its
understanding of what other maritime partners are working on in the Gulf of Guinea
and how their activities might support broader assistance initiatives.
The last set of actors CNE-C6F has been partnering with to support its TSC efforts has
been U.S. Navy reserve personnel through the Maritime Partnership Program (MPP).
Since there is little or no full-time maritime experience within American embassies in
the Gulf (the only naval attaché in the GOG is in Ghana, and there are no U.S. Navy
personnel in any of the GOG offices of defense cooperation), MPP reservists have
proved to be an effective short-term way to support theater security cooperation.44
Implications for the Future
Shaping operations will continue to be central to CNE-C6F’s strategy to generate a cul-
ture of maritime safety and security in the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Guinea.
Leveraging NATO and other existing security frameworks to build partner capacity and
capability will remain a central pillar of the strategy. As cooperation matures among
NATO, the European Union, and other Mediterranean partners, information sharing
and maritime domain awareness can be expected to become norms in the Mediterra-
nean. This should enable CNE-C6F and its partners to continue to deter, preempt,
interdict, and respond to maritime threats over the next five to ten years.
Similar capabilities will take longer to mature in the Gulf. The low starting point of
shaping operations and weak regional organizations, combined with weak national
governance and limited resources, means the ways employed in the Mediterranean may
not always be applicable in the GOG. Top-down approaches that focus on helping indi-
vidual nations create national maritime safety and security strategies to share with oth-
ers may be the best way for CNE-C6F to generate the political will needed to achieve
objectives over the short term. The command will also seek to follow through on the
Cotonou Plan of Action and build regional ownership in the plan’s objectives. Lastly,
unless political will and local ownership are created, CNE-C6F should limit the mate-
rial assets provided to GOG states; without the will, assets will eventually deteriorate.
5 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
The shaping operations that CNE-C6F conducts are based on the premise that a safe and
secure maritime domain will help nations and regions achieve stability and economic
development. This is undoubtedly true, but as EUCOM and CNE-C6F acknowledge,
underlying problems ashore, if not solved, may prevent long-term success.45 Maritime
insecurity is a direct reflection of problems ashore. Security cooperation planners must
keep this in mind and find a way to bridge the gap between fostering development ashore
and maritime initiatives. Achieving better unity of effort across the interagency and with
regional organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and partnering countries is central to this endeavor.
This is a fairly difficult task. Considerable distrust of the U.S. military’s motives exists
among many current and potential partners. To overcome it, CNE-C6F staff members
have learned to be good listeners and focus on partner needs first. Dictating preconceived
solutions is an ineffective way to build sustained long-term cooperation and partner
capacity. This applies to interagency partners as well.
A significant implication is that theater security cooperation and other shaping opera-
tions require the military and interagency to develop a new and different portfolio of
strategies and capabilities. Resources will need to be realigned in order to allow the
military and interagency to develop the skills to link insecurity and development. Mili-
tary personnel will find advanced training and degrees in agriculture, fisheries and
environmental management, languages, and the social sciences of great use. Tours of
duty may need to be lengthened from two or three years to four or more. As CNE-C6F
conducts more shaping operations, especially in Africa, more robust interagency man-
ning will become essential. The military can help set the conditions for development,
but it is essential that international, nongovernmental, and development agencies be
involved as well. To date, they are lagging.
Another implication is the importance of cooperation within the U.S. interagency. The
shaping operations of Commander Naval Forces Europe–Commander Sixth Fleet
require interagency coordination and the alignment of objectives and resources with
needs. Security and development initiatives need to link the sea and land domains.
Security standards, port and road improvements, and agricultural and economic devel-
opment programs are interrelated. While some alignment does occur at the national
level in Washington, more is needed in theater at the operational level.46
If maritime security, as Admiral Ulrich likes to say, is all about building a better net-
work and as many partnerships as possible, the solutions lie in security cooperation.
Shaping in this context is about advancing American interests by building awareness,
partner capabilities, partnerships, and the ability to influence events through greater
trust and transparency.
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Building Partners’ Capacity
The Thousand-Ship Navy
RONALD E. RATCLIFF
That which is common to the greatest number has the least care be-
stowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the
common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individ-
ual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to ne-
glect the duty which he expects another to fulfill.
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS
In the fall of 2005, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, challenged the world’s maritime nations to raise what he called a “thousand-ship
navy” to provide for the security of the maritime domain in the twenty-first century.
Speaking at the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War Col-
lege, in Newport, Rhode Island, Admiral Mullen candidly admitted to the assembled
chiefs of navy and their representatives from seventy-five countries that “the United
States Navy cannot, by itself, preserve the freedom and security of the entire maritime
domain. It must count on assistance from like-minded nations interested in using the
sea for lawful purposes and precluding its use for others that threaten national,
regional, or global security.”1 He had voiced the idea a month earlier in an address to
students at the College, but he now elaborated the concept:
Because today’s challenges are global in nature, we must be collective in our response. We are bound
together in our dependence on the seas and in our need for security of this vast commons. This is a
requisite for national security, global stability, and economic prosperity.
As navies, we have successfully learned how to leverage the advantages of the sea . . . advantages such
as mobility, access, and sovereignty. . . . We must now leverage these same advantages of our profes-
sion to close seams, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure the security of the domain, we collectively, are
responsible for. As we combine our advantages, I envision a 1,000-ship Navy—a fleet-in-being, if you
will, made up of the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world.2
Nearly two years after the bold proposal for a multinational maritime force, little prog-
ress seems to have been made in constituting this “navy-in-being.” This article argues
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that the thousand-ship navy, now more generally referred to within the U.S. Navy as
the “Global Maritime Network,” or “Partnership,” is an idea well worth pursuing. But
the Navy is struggling (perhaps even failing) to build support for it, for three reasons.
First, it has not invested sufficient resources—monetary, administrative, or intellectual—
to achieve the important goals articulated. Second, the Navy does not appear to appre-
ciate fully the nature of the challenges it faces in overcoming the global maritime man-
ifestation of the classic “tragedy of the commons” (which will be discussed below).
Third, despite its rhetoric, the service has not made the thousand-ship navy/Global
Maritime Partnership (TSN/GMP) a part of its current maritime strategy, which raises
doubts as to whether such a concept will be incorporated in the new strategy currently
being written. The absence of any mention of the thousand-ship navy in Admiral
Mullen’s May 2007 testimony before Congress on the status and future of the service
seems to belie the importance he has given it in forums involving the international naval
community.3 The lack of such official support for the TSN/GMP has likely been inter-
preted by nations reluctant to participate as a sign of weakness in American commit-
ment to the concept.
This article will present its argument in three parts. The first will address the goals and
objectives of the thousand-ship navy/Global Maritime Partnership that have been com-
municated in such unofficial venues as the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and Navy
Times. The second part will examine the challenges the U.S. Navy faces in convincing
the rest of the world to expend limited resources on an international navy. The third
will identify specific steps and initiatives that need to be given serious consideration if
the potential and goals of the concept are to be realized. Unless the U.S. Navy is willing
to move beyond the public-relations program that now seems to substitute for serious
commitment, this bold concept risks becoming the maritime equivalent of Woodrow
Wilson’s League of Nations—that is, it will die, and not because it was a bad idea but
because the country that proposed it was not committed to it.
A Global Maritime Security Network
The rationale for the TSN has largely been seen within the U.S. Navy as emanating
from increased international maritime traffic due to globalization. In late 2005, Navy
officials asserted, “Promoting and maintaining the security of the global maritime
commons is a key element because freedom of the seas is critical to any nation’s long-
term economic well-being. . . . Policing and protecting the maritime commons against
a wide spectrum of threats is a high priority for all nations interested in economic
prosperity and security that comes from a safe and free maritime domain.”4
The service has used a series of magazine articles and speeches by various senior officers,
including Admiral Mullen, to explain and build support for the thousand-ship navy. The
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TSN/GMP is envisioned as an international maritime force, an aggregation of maritime
entities, not just of the world’s navies. It would also include the world’s coast guards, sea-
borne shipping enterprises (shipping lines, port facilities, and other maritime-related
entities), and various governmental agencies and nongovernmental bodies. In an effort to
head off concerns about sovereignty, the Navy has attempted to make clear that participa-
tion would be strictly on a voluntary basis and that the goal is simply to meet the “com-
pelling need” that has emerged “for a global maritime security network, a ‘Navy of
Navies,’ to protect the maritime domain and to ensure the lifeblood of globalization—
trade—flows freely and unencumbered.”5 Ten guiding principles have been established in
these public writings and statements for the “Navy of Navies”:6
• National sovereignty would always be respected.
• Nations, navies, and maritime forces would participate where and when they have
common interests.
• The focus would be solely on security in the maritime domain: ports, harbors,
territorial waters, maritime approaches, the high seas, and international straits, as
well as the numerous exploitable seams between them.
• While no nation can do everything, all nations could contribute something of value.
• The TSN/GMP would be a network of international navies, coast guards, maritime
forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and local law enforcement, all working
together.
• Nations or navies having the capacity would be expected to help less capable ones
increase their ability to provide maritime security in their own ports, harbors,
territorial waters, and approaches.
• Nations or navies that need assistance would have to ask for it.
• Each geographic region would develop regional maritime networks.
• To be effective and efficient, the Global Maritime Partnership would have to share
information widely; classified maritime intelligence would be kept to a minimum.
• This would be a long-term effort, but the security of the maritime domain demands
that it start now.
To operationalize the concept, the U.S. Navy identified two objectives it considers criti-
cal to protecting the world’s waterways and facilitating the free flow of trade among
nations: increased “maritime domain awareness,” through greater collaboration and
transfer of information among nations about anything maritime, and positioning of
maritime assets so as to be able to respond to crises or emergencies. The Navy views the
TSN/GMP as fundamentally a means of sharing responsibility for maritime security—
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“importing it into regions where it is lacking and exporting it from regions that have
the capability and desire to do so.”7 Proponents argue that the concept is already, to
some extent, in being; they regularly point to instances where navies have coordinated
operations on an ad hoc basis to achieve necessary and worthwhile goals. Among the
most cited are Task Force 150, which operates in and around the Saudi Arabian Penin-
sula; the Indonesian tsunami-relief effort of late 2004 and 2005; and the Straits of
Malacca counterpiracy agreement, known as MALSINDO, between Malaysia, Singa-
pore, and Indonesia.
Yet despite such efforts to “sell” the idea of a thousand-ship navy, in late 2006 Admiral
Mullen felt obliged to seek active support for it at two international maritime confer-
ences. At the Mediterranean Regional Seapower Symposium in Venice and at the West-
ern Pacific Naval Symposium in Pearl Harbor, he told his contemporaries that it was
time to “move beyond dialogue” and to “take tangible steps” that would “put these
powerful ideas to work at sea.”8 He argued three compelling reasons for moving faster
to constitute the Global Maritime Partnership. First, the pace of globalization is raising
the stakes for security in the maritime domain, where 90 percent of the world’s trade
passes from production to market; second, globalization has brought, along with its
benefits, new vulnerabilities as well, particularly to “ideologues, pirates, proliferators,
criminals, and terrorists” who not only are likely to target maritime regions but are
“innovative, smart and determined, and [able to] often act—and react—faster than
many of our traditional governing bodies.”9 Third, Admiral Mullen suggested, rapid
advances in technology and information technology can significantly facilitate multina-
tional naval operations, but only if nations take advantage of them.
Important as these points are, however, perhaps better explicating the way ahead and
accenting the tangible steps the U.S. Navy has already taken to make the concept a real-
ity would make a stronger argument for it. Also, and though the Navy has made clear
that it has no desire to dictate the terms of participation, it must provide leadership in
the form of action to draw in other navies. Specifically, the Navy would gain greater
purchase among the world’s maritime entities by acquiring, employing, and sharing the
necessary information and communications technologies than by merely highlighting
the possibilities they offer. Operations at sea cannot take place without the means to
coordinate the actions of participating units, and they cannot succeed without current
and actionable intelligence. Until the Navy can explain or demonstrate how both func-
tions will be accomplished in the TSN/GMP, it should expect only tepid responses from
potential participants.
Today, on the eve of the Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium, two years after
the thousand-ship navy concept was introduced, it is becoming increasingly apparent
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that the concept has yet to gain widespread support among the world’s maritime enter-
prises. Despite the success of combined naval operations in highly publicized operations
that averted or relieved major human disasters around the world, many countries remain
cautious about “joining” or being seen as advocates of the Global Maritime Partnership.
However logical and benign the thousand-ship navy seems to the United States, other
countries remain openly wary of its intended purposes and possible unintended conse-
quences. They have legitimate concerns, and if the U.S. Navy is to constitute a thousand-
ship navy it must address them forthrightly. That challenge is not inconsequential.
Hyperbole and rhetorical calls to act for the greater good of a globalizing world will not
be sufficient. Indeed, if the logic of the TSN/GMP has clear appeal to many nations, the
concept also has weaknesses that if not resolved will likely prove fatal.
“The Tragedy of the (Maritime) Commons”
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his
own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the com-
mons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
GARRET HARDIN
The “maritime commons” comprise seas and waterways either beyond sovereign con-
trol of any nation or under the shared sovereignty of two or more. With no single guar-
antor of their security and well-being, they are attractive for illicit activities. Since
September 2001 the U.S. Navy has become particularly concerned about these areas
and has called for greater scrutiny over and the “policing and protecting” of those
where the collective economic prosperity of the world’s trading nations might be
threatened.10
As Admiral Mullen has declared, the expansive maritime commons and the wide range of
threats that exist there are beyond the capacity of any navy, including that of the United
States, to police or control. The nature of those threats, however, is not self-evident, nor is
their urgency commonly acknowledged. Among the reasons for this, one of the most
important is that the benefits that accrue from the maritime commons are not equally
shared. Where the United States sees in the maritime common the free flow of com-
merce, many other states are forced to live with entirely different circumstances. For
major trading nations like the United States the concern with respect to the maritime
commons is a disruption in shipping, which would cause significant perturbations in the
world’s economy. Arguably, however, those effects would be brief and quickly overcome.
The problems that many other nations face in the maritime commons, however, are not
potential but present, not episodic but long term, and they affect “human” security more
than national or economic security. These challenges include waterborne pandemics,
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maritime crime and piracy, the misuse of ocean resources, and the smuggling of contra-
band goods, people, and drugs. These challenges are largely regional; they do not threaten
the global village but constitute a menace to the well-being of local populations.
Thus the “tragedy of the maritime commons”—notwithstanding assertions that every-
one benefits from the security of the maritime commons, nations benefit so unequally
that many see no reason to contribute to it.11 Many nations that lie near or astride
important parts of the maritime commons but do not benefit significantly from world
trade are hard pressed to justify spending their limited resources to help the world’s
wealthiest countries get richer. The U.S. Navy’s seeming lack of appreciation for these
differing equities may account for much of its inability to generate enthusiasm.
This raises an important challenge for the combatant commands—building capacity
for partnership through security cooperation. If the Navy is to nurture an international
global maritime network of entities that contribute to the maritime domain, it must
move past a rhetoric focused on a threat to world trade. It must find ways to make the
thousand-ship navy a solution to a wider set of problems.
International Doubt and Reticence
Much of the contemporary naval literature refers to providing for or protecting the
“global maritime commons” as if it were a self-evident good. But as we have seen, the
reality is that individuals usually only act when it benefits them directly. Aristotle, in
the passage quoted above, is likely the first to warn against assuming too much collec-
tive good will as being the natural order of things.12 During the Peloponnesian War, in
the fifth century BC, the Athenians made the point harshly to envoys of the Aegean
island of Melos (as reported by Thucydides): “You know as well as we do that right, as
the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what
they can and the weak suffer what they must.”13
Neither are the navies of the world equals; the U.S. Navy is, and will likely remain for some
time to come, completely and absolutely dominant wherever and whenever it chooses to
operate. Admiral Mullen’s predecessor, Admiral Vern Clark, bluntly stated what most in the
service believe, that the U.S. Navy would and should “operate from the maritime domain
anywhere, anytime, without a permission slip.” While the ramifications of American com-
bat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are beyond the scope of this article, it seems appar-
ent that American willingness to “go it alone” gives many nations reasons for reluctance to
join a potentially encumbering, if ad hoc and voluntary, arrangement like the Global Mari-
time Partnership.
6 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
Asian Concerns
India, for example, has been quite candid in its assessment of American interest in the
global maritime domain. A recent article in an influential Indian national security pub-
lication seems to capture a broadly held sentiment about American intentions.
Among the foremost security concerns of the nation after 9/11 is the use of weapons of mass destruc-
tion by terrorists on its territory and their proliferation through inimical states. The global reach of the
predominantly maritime threat and the “overstretch” of the US Navy have led to the initiation of a series
of American initiatives like Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Container Security Initiative (CSI)
and Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), all aimed at mobilizing global support to secure the
US “homeland.”
A “Thousand-ship Navy” (TSN) is another novel concept; recently defined . . . as “a global maritime
partnership that unites maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and international, gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental agencies to address mutual concerns.” . . . The TSN is thus show
cased as a benign initiative, aimed at obtaining the co-operation of “friendly navies.”14
The implication here is that the TSN/GMP is largely an attempt by the United States to
secure its homeland while avoiding the controversial aspects of the programs listed
above and the legitimate concerns they have generated for national sovereignty. That
said, the Indians have also noted, pragmatically, that their nation has much to gain: it
would gain access to the U.S. intelligence grid; information sharing would neither
impinge on India’s sovereignty nor conflict with international law; and participation
would provide India politico-diplomatic goodwill, since it is unlikely that it will for-
mally join the Proliferation Security Initiative, at least in the near term.15
Possibly more surprising has been the assessment by Australian and other Asia-Pacific
security analysts that the TSN/GMP is not feasible in Asia because of differing maritime
security strategies, divergent perceptions of the maritime threat, and long-standing and
unresolved territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea.16 In this view,
China is an impediment to the thousand-ship navy, because of its support of regional
maritime projects and agreements that the United States and its principal Asian ally,
Japan, have refused to join.17 Nowhere has this been more evident than in the Straits of
Malacca, where the U.S.-sponsored RMSI has drawn heavy criticism from Malaysia,
Indonesia, and even Singapore.18 China, in contrast, has gained extensive diplomatic
leverage by calls for nonintervention by other navies in the straits and by financial sup-
port of local maritime initiatives. Chinese relations with Taiwan impede some navies
from participation in the TSN/GMP. Japan and Korea, however, are strong proponents
of the concept, which adds another complication to its implementation because it puts
them at odds with China.
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China’s own strategic calculus and security strategy vis-à-vis the United States are
works in progress. Recently, Jerry M. Hultin, former Under Secretary of the Navy, and
Admiral Dennis Blair, former commander of U.S. Pacific Command, wrote,
As China’s own naval power grows, it will need to fashion a naval policy within a national security
policy that supports its own interests. It can cooperate with the United States by coordinating naval
strategy and deployments, as do many of America’s current allies; it can fashion its own separate strat-
egy, seeking to compete with or displace American strategy, or it can pursue a mixed strategy, com-
bining elements of both approaches.
For its part, the United States will need to make adjustments in its policies and strategies as Chinese
military power grows.19
While the potential exists for the United States to make room for China and other
problematic countries, such as Iran and Venezuela, to join the thousand-ship navy,
mutual distrust will make it difficult to argue that “everybody is welcome.” In point of
fact, not everyone is welcome, and the criteria that define “like-minded” interests have
yet to be clearly delineated. Yet Russian naval participation in NATO’s Operation
ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR may provide a model for how countries with competing national
interests can participate constructively in the TSN/GMP.
The principles and the goals of the thousand-ship navy are nearly synonymous with
those of the U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security. The latter is based on three
broad tenets: preserving the freedom of the seas, which includes the right of innocent
and transit passage and access to the world’s ports; facilitating and defending the free
flow of maritime commerce; and promoting the movement of desirable goods and
people across borders while screening out dangerous people and goods.20 The similarity
in terms and concepts is not lost on those who must decide whether to participate in
the Global Maritime Partnership and then justify their choices to domestic authorities
who critically examine the cost and kinds of operations their naval forces conduct.
Unless compelling reasons can be found that link participation directly to local secu-
rity, few naval forces will be willing to join, even briefly.
Contentious Objectives and Chronic Problems
As noted earlier, increased maritime security involves two primary objectives: an effec-
tive level of maritime domain awareness must be established, and naval forces must be
in the right places at the right times. Both present considerable operational and admin-
istrative challenges.
The level of maritime domain awareness necessary to disrupt or eliminate illicit enter-
prises requires information and intelligence analysis on a massive scale. Information is
available in many disparate and potentially valuable forms, such as invoices on maritime
cargo, shipping companies, port activity, insurance assessments, fishery area control and
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management schemes, naval and national intelligence, and countless others. While the
TSN/GMP is envisioned as comprising regional maritime networks, the questions of
whom these networks would involve, where they would be, and how they would collect,
process, and disseminate information are all yet to be resolved. Three exemplars are cited
as steps in the right direction: the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center in the Medi-
terranean, the Malacca Strait Patrol Agreement, and Task Force 150, in the Red Sea and
Strait of Hormuz. These efforts have shown the potential of coordinated maritime opera-
tions, yet they have also made clear the substantial problems that arise when critical
information is classified by a nation. As the U.S.-led counterdrug operations in the Carib-
bean have shown conclusively, actionable intelligence is the single most important prereq-
uisite for interdicting illicit traffic at sea.21
Putting maritime assets in the right location is equally problematic. Most nations do
not have the resources to sustain units where they can be most effective. Often, activity
of the kind that the Global Maritime Partnership is intended to combat occurs in the
waters of the world’s poorest nations; their navies find the distances involved too great,
but national sensitivity over sovereignty often precludes them from asking for help. In
this sense national pride is an impediment to greater cooperation among the world’s
navies, even in a framework as flexible, informal, and ad hoc as the thousand-ship navy.
Additionally, the rules of engagement that govern the actions of each navy begin with
national rules and regulations and so may be at odds with the wishes and desires of the
United States and its vision for the TSN/GMP. The experience of U.S. intervention
efforts in the Western Hemisphere provides numerous examples of conflicting national
priorities and perceptions of the issues leading to less than optimal results.22
Among the critical challenges, then, that confront successful implementation of the
Global Maritime Partnership, four stand out. The first is building trust. Long-held ani-
mosities, suspicions of other nations’ intentions, and the general secrecy that sur-
rounds national security plans affect relations among some of the most important
potential contributors to the thousand-ship navy. The list is large—India and Pakistan,
China and India, Japan and China, Korea and Japan, Australia and Asia, Southeast Asia
and China, Chile and Argentina, and Venezuela and the United States, to name a few—
and the issues complicated and often intense. The second challenge concerns capability
and capacity. Many navies and coast guards find it difficult to act even when in a posi-
tion to do so. Most countries’ navies are more akin to coast guards. Ships and craft
suited for customs and border patrol or for monitoring fisheries and economic exclu-
sion zones are not well suited to dealing with terrorists or proliferators of weapons of
mass destruction. Likewise, the carrier-centric U.S. Navy is ill suited to operations in
the littorals.
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A third issue involves jurisprudence. Domestic and international law governing con-
duct on the seas is notoriously vague and complex, which complicates the actions of
forces operating within a construct like the Global Maritime Partnership. Individual
navies or commanders willing to act consistently with the intent of the TSN/GMP may
be overruled by sovereign authorities because of the vagaries of the law. Problems of
this sort already impede the kind of cooperation envisioned by the TSN/GMP, and
there would be no mechanism within the partnership to resolve them. Finally, there is
the issue of communications. While new communications technologies offer many
channels, “common operating pictures” and maritime domain awareness require more
than Web portals and radio circuits. An operational picture at sea is fluid, and a lapse
of information flow for even a few hours can destroy any chance for coordinated or
purposeful action.
Nothing in this list is new, but the world’s navies have yet to find ways to resolve them.
The Global Maritime Partnership is attractive for that very reason to many nations that
have been frustrated by other attempts and see in the TSN/GMP at least a promising
start. Concrete action and active dialogue, however, must replace rhetoric and pleas for
greater commitment on the part of others. If the thousand-ship navy is to survive and
grow, the U.S. Navy will need to take a stronger role in constituting a “navy in being,”
in a way that does not alarm or put off potential participants. It must be more a cata-
lyst than a leader.
Time for Commitment
Long a purpose-built “blue water” fleet, the U.S. Navy continues to struggle mightily to
transform itself into a force that can meet the operational challenges of littoral waters.23
Moreover, the inability of the Navy, or of its joint and interagency partners, to secure
the strategic approaches to the United States against drug traffickers despite nearly
twenty years of intensive effort speaks starkly to the magnitude of taking on the global
maritime commons. Still, the thousand-ship navy makes sense, and for the reasons
Admiral Mullen identified in 2005. But unless the U.S. Navy shows commitment to the
Global Maritime Partnership by programs and initiatives that directly support it, navies
that have not yet signed on are unlikely to do so any time soon.
The U.S. Navy can and should consider seriously a number of steps in order to revive
enthusiasm for the thousand-ship navy. The first is to make it an important element of
the forthcoming maritime strategy. Seapower in the twenty-first century is unique in
history. Where once fleet power was determined by the amalgamation of large numbers
of capital ships and their escorts, modern weapons make such assemblages dangerous
and impracticable. In any case, the world’s nations have demonstrated a growing
unease about, if not downright unwillingness to follow, American-conceived and -led
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military operations. A clear and unambiguous statement of commitment to the Global
Maritime Partnership in the maritime strategy now being formulated would signal to
the world’s navies that the U.S. Navy is serious about a global approach to protecting
the maritime commons.
Provide clearer guidance about the structure of the TSN/GMP. One of the advantages of
the concept is its ad hoc nature, a “come as you are, when you can” approach that frees
navies from formal agreements or binding obligations. This is also, unfortunately, one
of its greatest weaknesses. Without greater specificity about operating procedures,
command relationships, and basic rules of engagement, navies are hard pressed to
explain or justify their commitment to their national leaderships. There are several
rudimentary steps that the U.S. Navy and committed partners can take to eliminate the
less beneficial elements of “ad-hocracy.” One would be establishing a basic command
structure dividing the maritime commons into defined operating areas and assigning
nominal leadership roles for regional powers. Another would be to delineate a basic set
of rules of engagement addressing obvious and necessary restraints and constraints. A
third would be linking the TSN/GMP with existing organizations such as the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization and with the antipiracy centers being established in vari-
ous parts of the world.
Third, forget GFS and embrace TSN/GMP-FS. Part of the current Navy strategy is to
construct and deploy “Global Fleet Station” (GFS) ships to support the ships of the
U.S. Navy and regional partners in a variety of maritime and littoral operations. These
ships and the operational ideas behind them show how the Global Maritime Partner-
ship could work and could serve as fleet experiments to identify operational and
administrative problems and facilitate international solutions. A group of dedicated
TSN/GMP–Fleet Station ships, under the administrative control of current U.S. mari-
time component commanders, could be deployed to show Navy commitment to the
concept and entice other nations to participate. These platforms could be used as test
beds to experiment with command-and-control procedures using common communi-
cations equipment and operating concepts.
Make the U.S. Coast Guard a major element of the thousand-ship navy. Few navies have,
like the U.S. Navy, the sole purpose of warfighting. Most navies, as we have noted, are
more like the Coast Guard, tasked with maritime law enforcement and stewardship of
their countries’ maritime resources. Indeed, some analysts have suggested that we are
really speaking of the “thousand-ship coast guard.” Given the kinds of operations that
are likely to occupy the Global Maritime Partnership, placing the Coast Guard at or
near the vanguard has an indisputable logic. If the TSN/GMP is to be a network of all
maritime-related organizations, not just an ad hoc collection of navies, the Coast
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Guard seems to be the most logical agent to coordinate it. The Navy, then, needs to find
the Coast Guard a prominent role in the development and growth of the concept and,
relatedly, to consider how the Navy and Coast Guard could operate as a national force
in American territorial waters as well as abroad.
Partners must be enabled to see the same operating picture the U.S. Navy does—allies and
coalition partners have been telling the Navy that for years, and seemingly endless
studies of communication, command, and control only confirm it. Until the U.S. Navy
provides a portal through which its partners can tap into its information, it cannot
expect them to contribute freely to it. Until the Navy can show that it will give as good
as it gets, reluctant partners will continue to have a sound reason to resist meaningful
participation.
Finally, if the U.S. Navy is to gain credibility and support for the TSN/GMP, it must
take steps to support and leverage recent efforts by America’s political leadership to
ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) within the next
two years.24 American objections have ranged from concerns about loss of national sov-
ereignty to unease over access to important but often contentious seaways. The unwill-
ingness of the United States to sign an agreement that almost all of the rest of the
world has ratified makes advocacy for the TSN/GMP appear hypocritical. UNCLOS is
not a perfect document, but such agreements rarely are, and America already purports
to abide by its rules; formal ratification should be painless, and it would constitute a
major step toward protecting the global maritime commons. The nation must demon-
strate that it honors Admiral Mullen’s statement that “acting in one’s national interest”
serves the global interest as well.25
The thousand-ship navy is a concept whose time has come. The U.S. Navy can no longer
protect the world’s most important waterways alone. Still, the Navy’s conception of the
maritime commons as being a self-evident good must be modified both in word and in
deed. Naval strategies and concepts do not stand in isolation from the particular issues
and interests that dictate national security policies. Hence, the U.S. Navy must make
clear its firm commitment to, and the benign intent of, the thousand-ship navy
through concrete acts. The alternative is to lose the opportunity for an innovative and
workable solution to an age-old problem—protecting the freedom of the seas in a time
of great uncertainty and peril.
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Regional Security Initiative
Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa
STEPHEN A. EMERSON
Africa, with its fragile governments, abject poverty, and seemingly incessant political and
social turmoil, is increasingly seen by the United States as the next major battleground in
the global struggle against terrorism. Nowhere is this prospect more apparent today than
in the greater Horn of Africa, where the U.S. military has been spearheading efforts to
shape the regional security environment to counter the growth and spread of violent rad-
ical Islamists.1 Utilizing an array of military, diplomatic, and civic-action tools, the U.S.
Central Command is seeking aggressively to counter, and more importantly preempt, the
terrorist threat in this strategic part of Africa. At the center of these efforts is the Com-
bined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the mission of which “is focused on
detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in
the region—denying safe havens, external support and material assistance for terrorist
activity.”2 CJTF-HOA is an example of a regional security initiative that gives the United
States a regional strike capability, military training capacity, and civic-action instrument
that “is a creative, good-faith effort to shape the environment in a preventative manner.”3
Despite the many notable achievements in this part of Africa by the United States—
and CJTF-HOA in particular—since 2002, the region remains a volatile mix of instabil-
ity and unpredictability. Moreover, while the ability to alter the strategic landscape
offers great potential security benefits to the United States in Africa, the Horn’s terribly
unforgiving geopolitical environment poses even greater risks should Washington mis-
calculate. All too frequently, for example, Washington has opted, in its zeal to combat
terrorism in the region, for short-term military gains at the expense of longer-term
political and economic development objectives, undermining thereby its own prospects
for building future regional peace and security. Failure to address adequately the
underlying political and social dynamics of the Horn is the most serious challenge to
the ultimate success of this regional security initiative.
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The Security Environment: Old Animosities, New Challenges
The greater Horn of Africa has long been viewed as one of the most complex and dead-
liest security environments on the continent. An enduring legacy of bitter national and
personal rivalries, divided societies, highly militarized regimes, and great-power
involvement has made protracted conflict a hallmark of the region for the past forty
years. As Ruth Iyob and Edmond Keller note, this spectrum of conflict runs the full
gamut—from interstate competition for regional hegemony to localized struggles over
the control of land, water, resources, and people.4 Since the mid-1960s, the greater
Horn has witnessed two large-scale conventional wars; bitter, long-running internal
conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda; and innumerable border clashes
and proxy wars, altogether resulting in the deaths of millions of people and fueling
massive population movements, famine, and starvation. Not surprisingly, the greater
Horn is one of Africa’s poorest and least developed regions, characterized by extreme
7 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
MAP 1
Horn of Africa
political instability, unceasing violence, widespread poverty, and great human suffering.
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Djibouti, in fact, rank in the bottom fifth of the most
recent UN Human Development index.5
From the onset of the European scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century to
the superpower rivalry of the Cold War, outside forces played major roles in defining
the nature of regional conflict and in shaping the security environment. Arbitrarily
drawn colonial borders, fragmented African societies, and a divide-and-rule strategy
helped set the stage for future confrontations in and among the people and countries
of the region. Though it ended nearly twenty years ago, the Cold War in Africa only
served to reinforce this pattern of conflict by aggravating the spread of competing
authoritarian regimes, militarization, proxy wars, and intervention in the domestic
affairs of neighboring states. The result has been a lasting legacy of institutionalized
violence, heightened lethality, and a struggle for regional dominance by multiple,
competing centers of power, each of which sees the others as central threats to its
very survival.6
In recent years, six powerful and mutually reinforcing events and trends have come
effectively to define the region and its security problems:
• The collapse of the Somali state and ensuing rise of warlordism
• Eritrea’s independence and its lingering border conflict with Ethiopia
• Chronic Sudanese internal instability
• The proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the associated rise of
powerful nonstate actors
• Recurring natural disasters and humanitarian crises resulting in major population
movements
• Globalization and the resulting internationalization of domestic and regional
conflict.
Today’s security environment in the Horn, according to John Prendergast and Colin
Thomas-Jensen,7 can be described primarily in terms of two major conflict clusters—
the interlocking rebellions in Sudan and its neighbors, and the Ethiopian-Eritrean con-
flict (the latter, largely, as played out within the context of an internal Somali power
struggle). Violence within Sudan’s Darfur region has left as many as 450,000 dead and
displaced another 2.5 million, while helping to worsen instability in neighboring Chad
and now the Central African Republic.8 Despite the promise of peace following the end
of Sudan’s long-running north/south conflict in 2005, the security situation in the
south of the country remains fragile, and the spillover effects of Uganda’s civil strife
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remain a serious obstacle to long-term peace. Likewise, the rise and fall of the funda-
mentalist Islamic Courts Union in Somalia, the December 2006 military intervention
of Ethiopian troops in Somalia amid reports of Eritrean support to the Islamists, the
installation of the feckless and unpopular Transitional National Government in
Mogadishu in early 2007, and the looming return of Somali warlords collectively paint
a bleak security picture. Moreover, both these regional conflict clusters have become
inexorably intertwined with the American effort to counter the rise of radical Islamists
and the associated spread of international terrorism. It is this challenging and danger-
ous security environment that Washington has actively sought to change, through U.S.
Central Command, as part of its strategy for combating international terrorism in
Africa. That awareness of these challenges is even more acute is evidenced by the pend-
ing standing-up of U.S. Africa Command, which will “enhance our [American] efforts
to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of
development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth.”9
A Gathering Storm
Despite the 1998 terrorist bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam that killed 263 people and injured thousands more, and the retaliatory Ameri-
can cruise missile strikes against Sudan that followed, Africa remained largely off the
radar of American military planners until the events of September 11, 2001. Beginning
in 2002, however, the Bush administration began to pay increasing attention to the
continent: “In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and
desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving
human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror.”10
Since then, Africa has only grown in importance to the United States, and many offi-
cials have come to see it as a key theater in the global fight against terrorism. In 2004
General James Jones, commander of U.S. European Command (which currently has
responsibility for about three-fourths of the continent), remarked, “I am concerned
about the large, ungoverned areas of Africa that are possible melting pots of the disen-
franchised of the world, so to speak, the terrorist breeding grounds. I believe that we’re
going to have to engage more in that theater.”11 Congressman Edward Royce under-
scored this message when he declared that Africa “is the place where our fight against
terrorism is being fought.”12
Washington has identified several critical regions or countries across the continent that
it believes will be essential to the success of the U.S. counterterrorism effort in Africa.
Not surprisingly, the Horn of Africa and Somalia top this list.13 With its long history of
conflict and huge stockpile of weapons; strong trade, social, and religious ties to the
nearby Arabian Peninsula; and shared poverty, poor governance, and legacy of external
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interference, the Horn “provides a tasting menu for potential terrorists.”14 In particular,
the U.S. Department of State has identified Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and
Sudan as posing, together, the most serious threat to the American interests in the
Horn, because of the active presence of al-Qa‘ida elements in these countries.15 The rise
in Somalia of the fundamentalist Islamic Courts Union—and its alleged international
terrorist links—to power in mid-2006 only reinforced Washington’s worst fear: “an
extremist, jihadist takeover of the government in Somalia.”16
To counter this gathering storm, shaping activities have been designed, and are ongoing,
to prevent failed or failing states, like Somalia, from becoming terrorist safe havens. Fur-
ther, the United States has sought to employ all instruments of national power to defeat
violent Islamic extremism and create a global environment inhospitable to terrorists and
their ideology.17 According to the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism
(NMSP-WOT), the American military will do this by denying terrorists what they need
to operate and survive, particularly WMD/E (weapons of mass destruction or effects);
enabling partner nations to counter terrorism; defeating terrorists and their organiza-
tions; countering state and nonstate support for terrorism, in coordination with other
U.S. government agencies and partner nations; and contributing to the establishment of
conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.18 More importantly, the
NMSP-WOT emphasizes that these tasks “call for both direct and indirect approaches,”
whereby the indirect approaches “focus on establishing the conditions for others to
achieve success.”19 By utilizing both the “soft” and “hard” edges of American military
power, the United States is expanding its security assistance programs to help nations
combat terrorism, while at the same time actively tracking down terrorists and their sup-
porting infrastructure. Beyond direct security assistance, the military is also charged with
strengthening partnerships with key allies, gaining the support of moderate Muslim gov-
ernments, and helping to address the underlying social and economic conditions that
promote hatred and radicalization.
These strategic guidance documents align well with Washington’s desire to maintain
the strategic initiative to combat international terrorism through preemptive action.
Underpinning this approach is the ability drastically to transform, or shape, the secu-
rity environment into one that is hostile to terrorist organizations. “Phase Zero” opera-
tions seek to address the underlying strategic environment in which an enemy may
operate: their “ultimate goal is to promote stability and peace by building capacity in
partner nations that enables them to be cooperative, trained, and prepared to help pre-
vent or limit conflicts.”20 Phase Zero, or shaping, operations are inherently preventive
in nature and seek to maximize resources by fostering long-term capabilities among
U.S. friends and allies; “If you don’t do anything and wait for something bad to hap-
pen, the cost of fixing that is always higher than the cost of what we’re doing now
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which is low-level, consistent, building relationships,” says General Jones.21 This think-
ing also reflects a maturing attitude within the American military to move beyond the
“find, fix, and finish” approach to address the root causes of terrorism rather than sim-
ply targeting high-value individuals.
In recent years much attention has been directed to “failed” or “failing” states as
enabling factors in both generating and sustaining international terrorism. According
to this argument, the collapse of the normal functions of government creates a situa-
tion conducive to the growth of terrorist organizations and also attracts international
terrorist networks seeking a safe haven. As has been previously noted, poor governance,
alienated populations, and weak institutions are defining hallmarks of many African
countries today, making them ripe targets for terrorist exploitation, according to Wash-
ington’s thinking. According to the 2006 Failed States Index, which weighs social, eco-
nomic, and political-military factors, three Horn of Africa countries—with Sudan
topping the list of all countries worldwide—are in critical danger of state collapse.22 If
the United States can help strengthen these highly vulnerable states, so goes the reason-
ing, it can eliminate terrorist breeding grounds, sanctuaries, and support structures
across the continent. In turn, building capacity to improve governance and economic
conditions and to maintain effective control over territory and people will be the cen-
tral challenge in addressing the problem of failed and failing states. This approach
aligns well with those calling for addressing the root causes of terrorism and not sim-
ply attacking the symptoms: “The optimal path to stability and reduced openings for
terror is markedly to improve the manner in which governments . . . serve their citi-
zens, that is, how they deliver governance.”23
Theory into Action: Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa
Growing worry that the Horn of Africa would become the “next Afghanistan” led Cen-
tral Command to create the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa in late 2002.
Since that time some 1,500–2,000 military and nonmilitary task force personnel, based
primarily at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, have been conducting counterterrorist opera-
tions, capacity building, and civic-action programs across the region.24 These activities
are ultimately designed “to prevent conflict, promote regional stability and protect
Coalition interests” in the Horn;25 the central task of CJTF-HOA, however, remains
“focused on detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist
groups operating in the region—denying safe havens, external support and material
assistance for terrorist activity.”26 Whether it means conducting joint antiterrorist oper-
ations, providing tactical training to regional allies, building military-to-military ties,
or digging wells, the fundamental justification and driving force behind current
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American engagement in the Horn is firmly grounded in the guiding principles of the
U.S. counterterrorism strategy. These principles—known as the “four Ds”* and set
forth in the NMSP-WOT—provide the strategic guidance for prosecuting the war on
terror. Consciously or not, the Horn has been made a test bed for Washington’s
counterterrorism effort in Africa.27
Direct military action against terrorists and suspected terrorist targets formally
remains the core mission of the task force, but this purely kinetic aspect has given way
to more classic shaping operations. The task force’s work is now more about winning
hearts and minds in the region and building indigenous capabilities than killing or
capturing terrorists. Rear Admiral Richard Hunt, a former CJTF-HOA commander, has
said, “We feel the best way to counter terrorism is to go after the conditions that foster
terrorism.”28 Hence, CJTF-HOA personnel today are more likely to be engaged in build-
ing schools, clinics, and hospitals in Ethiopia; providing direct medical and veterinary
assistance to local populations in northern Kenya; digging wells and handing out
school supplies in Djibouti; or contributing to humanitarian assistance missions than
in hunting down individual terrorist cells. In the first two years of CJTF-HOA’s exis-
tence, for example, it renovated thirty-three schools, eight clinics, and five hospitals;
dug nearly a dozen wells; and conducted nearly forty medical and veterinary visits.29
The task force’s annual budget has now grown to nearly $50 million.30 Such activities as
these are often understood to be the exclusive domain of the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development or nongovernmental organizations; nevertheless, Central Com-
mand has come to view this type of engagement as essential to the success of its
current shaping strategy in the Horn.
CJTF-HOA is attempting to alter the strategic security environment of the region also by
building partnerships and strengthening the security capacities of African governments. The
Pentagon believes that the best method for fostering long-term stability and combating ter-
rorism is by making regional allies more capable: “Many African nations [are] willing to help
but they need [American] assistance.”31 By addressing this capabilities gap, the United States
seeks to build powerful and like-minded allies, limit American military presence, more effec-
tively leverage its resources, and create a security environment that is inhospitable to the rise
or sustainment of terrorist organizations. Task force personnel have focused their training
efforts on developing basic infantry skills and small-unit tactics, and on building local antiter-
rorist units, intelligence collection, and military support infrastructure. The Ethiopian and
Kenyan militaries appear to be the primary recipients of this largess, but CJTF-HOA has
worked successfully with all friendly governments in the region over the years.32
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* Defend the United States through preemptive measures; defeat terrorists; deny terrorists sanctuary
and material assistance; and diminish ideological support for terrorist organizations.
Despite the strong emphasis on winning hearts and minds and building partner capac-
ity, when circumstances warrant, the United States has not hesitated to engage in direct
military action. Since its inception, CJTF-HOA forces have conducted numerous uni-
lateral and combined military operations of varying scale and scope against terrorist
targets of opportunity; in 2004, Brigadier General Mastin Robeson, USMC, who com-
manded the CJTF in 2003–2004, claimed that the task force was responsible for killing
or capturing twenty-five senior al-Qa‘ida operatives.33 Violent radical extremists,
including U.S.-identified al-Qa‘ida affiliates operating from war-torn Somalia into
neighboring countries, are seen as the most pressing direct threat to regional security.
Recent events in Somalia underscore the close—but often hidden—American military
influence on events on the ground. According to press reports, the Pentagon provided
significant intelligence and operational support in December 2006 to Ethiopian troops
who were invading to oust the fundamentalist Islamic Courts Union from power in
Mogadishu.34 Several sources also reported that U.S. ground forces, including Special
Forces personnel, operated inside Somalia during December and January.35 Washington
has confirmed that it carried out in January 2007 two air strikes on suspected al-Qa‘ida
personnel in Somalia although it has failed to acknowledge that the AC-130 gunships
were apparently operating from a clandestine Ethiopian airstrip.36 While certainly not
the primary means relied upon to alter the Horn’s security environment—lethal opera-
tions by CJTF-HOA have been few and far between—hard military power can be useful
if used judiciously.
With its small military footprint, civic-action focus, and cooperative approach to secu-
rity, CJTF-HOA is often widely touted as the template for American counterterrorism
in Africa through effective preemptive action. In 2005, Donald Rumsfeld, then secre-
tary of defense, called the joint task force “a model for the future of DOD [Department
of Defense]” with regard to its interagency focus.37 Or as the current CJTF-HOA com-
mander, Rear Admiral James Hart, has noted, “We’re arriving there early enough with
an opportunity to help shape the environment, work towards a more secure environ-
ment, and hopefully, to allow people the opportunity to choose a direction to go in
their lives that steers them away from extremism.”38 Only time will tell if he is right.
The Challenge Ahead
After nearly five years of actively seeking to shape the security environment in the Horn, the
United States finds itself much better positioned to combat international terrorism there
and address the root causes of the region’s chronic insecurity and instability. It has devel-
oped stronger and increasingly more militarily capable regional allies. Improved situational
awareness, enhanced intelligence collection, and increased government presence in outlying
areas have hindered attempts of terrorist and extremist organizations to operate or find safe
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haven. Washington has also burnished its public image, through humanitarian and civic
action programs that have undoubtedly improved the daily lives of thousands. Not surpris-
ingly, the Pentagon views its engagement in the Horn as highly successful to date.
Nonetheless, since 2002 the United States has only marginally improved regional stabil-
ity. For all its successes, the shaping strategy has failed to address fundamentally persis-
tent political and social problems that fuel and sustain conflict in the region. While
additional resources would certainly enable CJTF-HOA to expand its activities, more of
the same is not the long-term answer. The central challenge in the years ahead for U.S.
engagement in the Horn, as well as for the rest of Africa, will be to integrate the les-
sons—both good and bad—of the past five years into a broader U.S.-African partner-
ship that attacks the root causes of African instability while acknowledging the limits
of the American ability to alter the security environment. To do this effectively, Wash-
ington must move its engagement paradigm away from a U.S. military-dominated
approach designed to address hard security issues toward one aimed at achieving
greater human security through nonmilitary actors and civil organizations. Such a shift
would ultimately “reduce the drivers of conflict and instability” and produce “a secure
global environment favorable to U.S. interests.”39
The American military has become the preferred tool of American engagement in
Africa since 2001, although the nature of this engagement has radically changed. As the
evolution of CJTF-HOA has shown, the emphasis is now on flexing the softer side of
military power via shaping programs, not kinetic operations. While this approach has
proven to be highly effective in the early phases of U.S. engagement, it is ultimately
constrained by the military’s own warfighting orientation, which often clashes with
those of humanitarian and development organizations. Even when U.S. military and
other groups do the same kind of work, “the objectives of the two are utterly dissimi-
lar; humanitarian agencies aid the population without taking sides, and based on need,
while the U.S. military serve their own political and military objectives alone.”40 Rear
Admiral Hunt underscored this point when he noted that CJTF-HOA “civil affairs and
humanitarian projects are prioritized based on their potential to counter terrorist ide-
ology in the region.”41 Accordingly, the burden of building political, economic, and
social stability in the Horn needs to pass increasingly to other specialized elements of
the U.S. government, and the military needs to move from a leading to a supporting
role. The challenge thus becomes one of “demilitarizing” CJTF-HOA, transforming it
into an interagency engagement tool (along the lines of the proposed Africa Command
structure) while maintaining the ability to project military might when required.
Careful consideration should be given to this latter point. Too heavy a reliance on the
sharp edge of military power is likely to be counterproductive, to undercut longer-term
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political objectives for short-term military gains. Recent events in Somalia bear this
out. There the United States apparently relied on military means, in the form of Ethio-
pian military intervention, to oust what both Washington and Addis Ababa saw as a
growing radical Islamist threat to the region.42 The incursion was highly successful in
removing the fundamentalist Islamic Courts Union and installing a more pro-Western
and friendly government in Mogadishu, but long-term prospects for peace in the
divided country seem as bleak as ever. American and Ethiopian military involvement in
Somalia has most likely produced more instability and insecurity, by facilitating a
return to warlordism, undermining diplomatic and regional peace efforts, and stoking
Somali xenophobia and radicalism.43 Likewise, strengthening the Ethiopian govern-
ment’s military capability may have had unintended negative consequences for that
country’s domestic political situation, especially in regard to what regime critics see as
backsliding on Ethiopian democratic reforms and civil liberties in recent years.
The Somalia episode also illustrates the danger of American shaping operations
becoming too closely associated or entangled, in the name of security, with the policy
interests of a single country or regime. As Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen point out,
“the decision to support Ethiopia’s military invasion without devising a broader politi-
cal strategy was a stunning mistake.”44 To many in the Horn, Washington is increasingly
aligning its policies with Addis Ababa and thus indirectly siding with Ethiopia in
regional disputes, thereby raising serious concerns in Asmara, Khartoum, and the
streets of Mogadishu. To the extent that this is true, it undermines the ability of the
United States to mediate conflict and serve as a positive force for regional stability.
Likewise, the use of military-to-military relationships to build partnership capacity of
America’s African allies, while highly effective, needs to be balanced against the need of
the United States to promote democratic governance. Tipping the scales toward secu-
rity capacity at the expense of human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law, and trans-
parency will not serve the long-term goal of regional stability or human dignity.
The daunting challenge of how to work more effectively through sub-regional Afri-
can organizations, most notably the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development,
will undoubtedly test U.S. strategic patience. The American desire “to get things
done” is often perceived as aggressive unilateralism and dismissiveness toward local
concerns. To avoid these pitfalls, traditional military shaping operations need to
become more aligned with, and supportive of, the wider diplomatic and political
process of defusing conflict and building security. The Pentagon’s planned formation
of Africa Command may provide the institutional platform to do this in a truly
interagency structure that “really puts the [Department of Defense] guys in support
of other agencies,” according to General Peter Pace, speaking as chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.45 It will be a long and often torturous road, to be sure, but—as in
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ending the long-running civil war in southern Sudan in 2005—the United States has
proven it can work.
Africa, with all its problems and promise—weak and failing states, fragile democracies,
relentless cycles of violence, peace, and reconciliation—has burst to the top of the
American security agenda. From striking poverty and great human suffering to grow-
ing economic empowerment and perseverance, Africa poses vast shaping challenges—
as well as opportunities—for U.S. strategy in the struggle against international terror-
ism as encapsulated in the volatile Horn of Africa. While the counterterrorism issue
has brought the continent to the forefront of American concerns, the issues of security
and stability are much more complex; they are deeply rooted in centuries of African
history. It behooves American military leaders to remain mindful of that critical reality
when attempting to alter the Horn’s security environment.
Through such regional security initiatives as CJTF-HOA the United States has made
great progress in transforming the security environment in the region, but more needs
to be done. Moreover, it needs to be done differently as American engagement matures
and evolves. Washington will need to move away from its myopic focus on terrorism as
the wellspring of all the region’s security ills and toward a long-term and comprehen-
sive regional shaping strategy that truly tackles the problems of African, vice American,
security. In the end, the American strategic objective of peace and stability in the Horn
of Africa can be accomplished only by helping African societies solve their problems
from their own security perspectives. This will be the ultimate challenge for U.S. strat-
egy in the years ahead.
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Strategic Communication and the
Diplomacy of Deeds
DENNIS LYNN
The United States has lost its positive international image, and its foreign policy
inflames public opinion across the world. Across the globe, heads of state are finding it
politically useful to dissociate their countries from America’s embrace and oppose U.S.
foreign policy, thereby currying favor with domestic audiences. At the same time,
Islamic extremists have effectively executed a media strategy of sowing doubt and dis-
sension in the United States and its coalition allies, eroding America’s will to fight and
intimidating or isolating others who would take sides against the jihadists. New pro-
grams are needed to combat international terrorism, and they should be tailored to
construct a new image of the United States as a partner of choice. America’s ability to
defeat adversaries will require the creation of new coalition arrangements and the tak-
ing of the informational offensive. In the struggle for hearts and minds, ideas matter; a
strategic narrative that emphasizes a positive image of hope and opportunity must be
promoted. This chapter explores how the Navy can support the aims of joint shaping
through the use of strategic communication to shape world opinion, solidify key rela-
tionships, and bolster new partnerships.
Strategic Communication Defined
The U.S. government now recognizes strategic communication (SC) as an important
element of power. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) defined it as “focused
United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audi-
ences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national inter-
ests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans,
programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.”1 The sepa-
rate disciplines of public affairs, defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD), military
diplomacy, and information operations/psychological operations are now components
of a grand and dynamic strategic communication strategy that is being managed in an
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interagency fashion to achieve maximum effectiveness. The Defense Department has
now begun to “instill communication assessments and processes into its culture, devel-
oping programs, plans and policy, information and themes to support Combatant
Commanders that reflect the U.S. Government’s overall strategic objectives.”2 Seamless
communication across the U.S. government, with an eye to its effect abroad, is an over-
arching goal.
The United States must meld the traditional sources of power—military and economic—
with a new source, informational power, to achieve what Joseph Nye believes is the fun-
damental goal of power, “the ability to obtain the outcomes one wants.”3 Information,
unlike the other two sources, is “soft,” because of its “ability to attract and persuade
rather than coerce. It means that others want what the United States wants. . . . Soft
power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”4
The United States has soft power and must calibrate it with its other means. For instance,
America’s goodwill activities offer enormous soft-power persuasion possibilities. How-
ever, rarely are they formally and actively publicized to a global audience as a way of
enhancing American prestige and its image, not to mention of balancing negative news
reports. SC can “operationalize” soft power and thus transform humanitarian efforts,
security assistance, and economic aid into material for reshaping the image of the United
States in the world. The message, or narrative, must distinguish the United States from its
adversaries, present it as a country working cooperatively with other nations in building
more prosperous societies, and seek partner-country involvement both in solving mutual
problems through common effort and in communicating positive messages of American
help to respective domestic audiences. The cognitive domain is the target. Recent opera-
tions offer lessons essential to constructing a strategic narrative for the United States.
The Earthquake
On 8 October 2005 a devastating, 7.6-magnitude earthquake hit the northern part of
Pakistan; over the next five months 1,771 aftershocks were recorded.5 The United States
and its allies responded in a massive way to save lives. Rear Admiral Mike LeFever,
commander of Expeditionary Strike Group 1, was reassigned by U.S. Central Com-
mand (CENTCOM) to command a joint task force that would lead Operation LIFELINE
and with it what would become the longest-lasting and most extensive relief operation
in American history. He would not leave Pakistan for six months. Inside the country
within forty-eight hours, Rear Admiral LeFever began to organize a team to execute an
intricate, joint human assistance/disaster response operation, one with significant
political sensitivity.
The enormity of the destruction was significant: 73,338 people dead, 128,309 injured,
and over three million homeless.6 Likewise, the level of humanitarian relief was
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enormous: 11,620 short tons of cargo moved, 5,195 helicopter sorties flown, 34,914
patients treated, and 1,900 U.S. military personnel involved (providing command-and-
control, aviation, medical, and engineering support).7 Additionally, there was an
incredible outpouring of support for the victims from eighty-six foreign governments,
250 nongovernmental organizations, and twenty-two United Nations entities.8 Orga-
nizing such an effort required trained personnel, heavy equipment, and superior logis-
tics. Complicating the problem was the fact that Rear Admiral LeFever’s team worked
among a population known to sympathize with and support Taliban operations in
neighboring Afghanistan. The combination of earthquake devastation, the economic
support needed to help Pakistan recover, the military’s logistical and organizational
skill, the political-military uncertainty on the ground, and the need for public affairs/
public diplomacy expertise to communicate American relief efforts to Pakistanis all
combined to make LIFELINE a case study in how to organize a team, create unity in
effort, and execute a strategic communication strategy.
General John Abizaid, the CENTCOM commander at the time, gave succinct instruc-
tions to Rear Admiral LeFever: provide Pakistan relief and improve American-Pakistani
relations. America’s quick response in manpower and equipment, much of it already
deployed offshore or operating in the region, saved an estimated five hundred thousand
lives (the United States provided about 80 percent of the total relief to Pakistan). Improve-
ment in political relations, however, was complicated by past cuts in U.S.-Pakistan military
exchanges, which had strained relations between the two countries. The U.S. team was
careful in its public pronouncements to portray its presence as strictly one of providing
relief and supporting the Pakistani military. The strategy boosted the image of the
United States in Pakistan: by November 2005 favorable opinion was up to 46 percent
from 23 percent, and unfavorable opinion fell to 28 percent from 48.9 The change in
public opinion happened because the United States had “shown” up in friendly force
and had conducted a carefully considered successful strategic communication/public
diplomacy operation to promote U.S.-Pakistani relations. The purposeful effort to cre-
ate a positive American image enabled success in the relief operation.
Rear Admiral LeFever accentuated this point when he observed, “CDAC-PAK [Com-
bined Disaster Assistance Center–Pakistan] used an aggressive communication strategy
based on four cornerstones: Show the Flag, Face to Face Communication, Good News
Stories, Inform the People.”10 CDAC-PAK was the U.S. lead organization in the relief
effort. Its communication team leveraged previous U.S. government SC planning to
bring together quickly an experienced team of State Department professionals from
the embassy, supplemented by military public affairs officers (PAOs) and other Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) resources, to work with Pakistanis and a wide assortment of
international organizations. Embassy public-diplomacy staff members used their
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expertise in the political realities of Pakistan and their knowledge of national media
outlets to tell the story each day. Successful planning and real-time integration within
the U.S. team were crucial to the overall success of LIFELINE.
The strategic communication plan was executed by a number of different means. The
embassy produced daily news reports of America’s assistance to the Pakistani people,
always showing examples of support to the host country. Pakistani citizens would read
or see reports of Navy Seabees rebuilding schools in an “adopt a village” program.
Combat camera personnel were deployed from the United States to capture imagery
for high-quality videos for distribution—showing, for example, Chinook helicopters
evacuating the injured or American doctors treating the elderly and immunizing the
young. Pakistani media were often embedded on helicopters to cover these stories first-
hand. The Pakistani government was seen receiving over $7.2 million in medical, engi-
neering, and aircraft refueling equipment. Pakistanis would have seen the dock landing
ship USS Pearl Harbor (LSD 52) off-loading heavy engineering equipment in Karachi.
Souvenirs of knit caps, lapel pins, etc., were handed out, each with images of American
and Pakistani flags on them, thus helping to “brand” the message of bilateral friend-
ship. Continuity in these actions was critical; international media often lose interest in
a story after the first few weeks, after which U.S. government public diplomacy/strate-
gic communication specialists would have to fill the gap. LIFELINE was a success both
for what it accomplished in saving human lives and for the opinions changed in favor
of the United States. The combined effort of the U.S. military, State Department, and
the host country produced results.
Operation LIFELINE proved that the United States could create in real time a media-
savvy, targeted, and effective effort. Relief supplies and machinery arrived quickly. U.S.
Joint Forces Command’s Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) deployed over-
seas for the first time and effectively supported CDAC-PAK, explaining American
intentions to the Pakistani people and working closely with domestic media outlets.
Everyone understood the mission. There were clear objectives. Sufficient media means,
assets, and experience were present. Senior U.S. leadership recognized the priority of
SC and supported it. The geographic combatant commander/State relationship, among
a number of interagency efforts, worked well. The model of central management/dele-
gated execution was productive. LIFELINE media efforts were constant, continuous, and
coalition focused. The message was received and understood by the Pakistani people, as
indicated by later polls.
Strategic Narrative
Operation LIFELINE, then, is an example of the United States consciously telling a story
about itself—that it responds to suffering and provides relief assistance immediately
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after tragedies. The United States is one of the few countries in the world that can
translate promises into food, water, and medical assistance anywhere in the world
within a day of a natural disaster. There is much criticism of the United States as the
“911” force that kicks down doors, but these same capabilities enable it to put out fires,
provide medical treatment, and enable other governments, nongovernmental and
intergovernmental organizations to conduct relief efforts.
Lawrence Freedman calls this storytelling the “strategic narrative,” the “compelling
story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be
drawn. Narratives are designed or nurtured with the intention of structuring the
responses of others to developing events.”11 The world knows the United States can and
will help. Strategic narratives are analytical devices that help audiences make sense of
the world and integrate everyday political events into some larger coherent whole. Al-
Qa‘ida uses images of American military actions for its own strategic narrative of infi-
del crusaders trying to dominate Muslims, urging Muslims to unite and drive them
from their territories. Al-Qa‘ida statements are directed to winning Muslims to its side
and giving followers religious sanction for violence. A narrative establishes simple
objectives and allows for decentralization of operations. The idea of the infidel in the
land of Mohammad rallies deep-seated suspicion of Western intentions and generates a
valuable, interpretative strategic narrative.
The coalition of nations that oppose the jihadist ideology will need to devise a strate-
gic narrative too, to attract a “following” and challenge the extremist narrative. A
“narrative-centric warfare” approach will require the United States to develop a gen-
uine understanding of foreign cultures across the world. An appealing narrative
requires that. As one anthropologist has noted, “Cultural knowledge and warfare are
inextricably bound”; further, “Cultural knowledge of adversaries should be considered
a national security priority.”12 Extending that cultural insight to include nations the
United States wishes to attract into a coalition would seem prudent too. A strategic
narrative must exploit cultural knowledge to find convergence in objectives and create
cohesion among partners. A common framework helps coalitions weather the “bad
news days” that invariably occur when fighting such a determined foe. When each
“fighter” internalizes the objectives and values inherent in a strategic narrative, the nar-
rative “can act almost as a substitute for normal command and control.”13
A U.S.-coalition strategic narrative can also undermine the enemy’s narrative, because
values and vision differentiate the United States from al-Qa‘ida: the Islamic extremists
want to divide and conquer, where the United States leads coalitions to promote sover-
eignty and prosperity. By infusing a myriad of security and humanitarian actions with
greater purpose, members of a target audience of the “undecided” can observe and
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make strategic choices to reject violent extremists’ messages. Narrative-centric warfare
can become a powerful connector of peoples externally and bring cohesion internally
to the range of economic, diplomatic, and military efforts that a global coalition will
need to sustain. To this end, changes in the interagency process are necessary, and it
appears that the U.S. leadership is “getting the message.”
Interagency Developments
The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes, is in
charge of overall international strategic communication policy for the U.S. govern-
ment. She oversees directly the public diplomacy efforts of the Department of State
and its overseas missions; she also leads an interagency Policy Coordinating Commit-
tee, formed to connect public diplomacy efforts. Her testimony when confirmed in July
2005 declared how important reinvigorating the interagency process would be in reori-
enting public diplomacy: “President Bush and Secretary Rice have asked me to lead
that effort from the State Department, to identify and marshal all communication and
public diplomacy resources of the different government agencies and provide leader-
ship to make U.S. efforts more coordinated and more strategic.”14 Additionally, she
seeks to keep policy making and public diplomacy planning closely aligned; their sym-
biotic interaction means that words and deeds must be kept in sync.
The State-DoD relationship is the primary interagency relationship in this regard.
Cooperation between the two departments is underscored in Ambassador Hughes’s
three strategic imperatives:
• Offer people throughout the world a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is
rooted in America’s belief in freedom, justice, opportunity, and respect for all.
• Isolate and marginalize the violent extremists, confront their ideology of tyranny
and hate, undermine their efforts to portray the West as in conflict with Islam by
empowering mainstream voices and demonstrating respect for Muslim cultures and
contributions.
• Foster a sense of common interests and common values between Americans and
people of different countries, cultures, and faiths throughout the world.15
Existing programs are being revitalized, and new initiatives are being implemented to
support these three strategic imperatives. State provides a liaison officer to DoD’s pri-
mary SC working group. In addition to the political advisers at military commands to
provide political expertise, public diplomacy advisers are now being placed inside some
combatant commands. There is also discussion about embedding experienced DoD
public affairs and information operations officers from the combatant commander
staffs into public affairs staffs at embassies. Additionally, the State Department’s Rapid
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Response Unit produces quick summaries and talking points on hot issues of the day
for key senior officials to use with foreign officials and foreign media to ensure that
public diplomacy themes are propagated. Lastly, State has positioned public diplomacy
officers, conversant in local languages, in key locales to engage media in active, positive
public diplomacy and to counter false portrayals of American actions and policies.
State and DoD are working together to synchronize their respective efforts.
Within the Defense Department, a number of activities are closing identified capability
gaps. An SC “roadmap” now enumerates shortfalls and sets deadlines. Most impor-
tantly, a Strategic Communication Integration Group (SCIG) has been formed to unite
information-related elements and activities in DoD to keep operations, policy, and
communication synchronized. Information-related activities like defense support to
public diplomacy, public affairs, and information operations/psychological operations
are being coordinated, so as to help leadership understand and utilize nonkinetic
means of persuasion. Rear Admiral Frank Thorp, director of the SCIG and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication, oversees an institutionalized
strategic communication process that seeks to provide leadership, guidance, focus, and
synergy in this area. As SCIG director he is the principal DoD person to synchronizing
interagency SC efforts among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the
combatant commanders, and the military departments.16 Rear Admiral Thorp sees the
new SC process as evidence of a new school of strategic communication, one that is
“continuous and integrated from the beginning of each operational planning cycle,”
and where the “SC cycle moves quickly and can repeat itself several times in the course
of operational planning,” providing “a process to integrate and synchronize the DIME
[diplomatic, information, military and economic] effort, affecting the way we work to
achieve desired effects.”17
Navy Efforts
The Navy is adapting to the strategic environment and meeting the challenges laid
down in the QDR. A number of initiatives have been undertaken, and more are under
way, that will reshape Navy internal and external communications to “operationalize”
information more effectively. While the Navy will largely work in tandem with the
other services, U.S. government agencies, allies, and international organizations, in
support of the warfighters, its contribution will come largely from its ability to leverage
what is special about sailors, the role the service plays in the maritime domain, and
how its unique capabilities and approach to SC connects to the larger diplomatic,
information, military, and economic means at the national level.
As the QDR makes clear, fighting the information war is a vital part of fighting irregu-
lar warfare. Naval Operations Concept 2006 reinforces the point: “U.S. Naval forces will
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use and protect information to influence adversaries, advance friendly objectives, and
shape the operating environment to our advantage.”18 How can the Navy do this and
contribute to the larger U.S. government effort to win hearts and minds? The first step
is to understand the big picture and the need to support the larger “U.S. government
team.” State has outlined its strategic imperatives in partnership with Defense. The
United States is propagating its strategic narrative through the synergy of words and
deeds—Navy strategic communication and operations must be constantly reviewed to
ensure consistency with it. More directly, the Navy needs to be a strong player within
the SCIG process that is now under way and commit itself to this joint process, which
supports the combatant commanders—that is, bringing maritime-domain-related SC
proposals to the Strategic Communications Integration Group. It is through the SCIG
that the Navy synchronizes its efforts.
A March 2007 “Priority Tasking Memo” is the cornerstone of the Navy’s intent to sup-
port the QDR SC mandate and its approach to doing so. Under a focus area of “Build-
ing Strong Partnerships,” it lists SC as a force enabler for the twenty-first-century
Navy.19 In the memo the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) outlined nine “you wills” in
support of Navy SC, most of them listing the Chief of Naval Information in either the
leading or a supporting role. Key initiatives include:
• Establishment of strategic communication throughout the Navy as an integrating
process
• Integration of SC into operational planning and policy development
• An implementation plan, synchronizing all communication capabilities
(information operations, public affairs, military diplomacy, defense support to
public diplomacy, and visual information)
• Closure of capability and capacity gaps
• Support to the SCIG
• Development by the Defense Information School of basic, intermediate, and
advanced courses to help train PAOs and civilian equivalents in the principles of SC
• A “battlespace strategic communication” course for PAOs assigned to battle groups,
naval component commanders, fleet commanders, and combatant commanders
• An SC class for unrestricted line officers (especially prospective commanding
officers and executive officers).
Navy leadership is making strategic communications a priority. All of this in time will
help support the warfighter, not only because each initiative together adds up to more
than the sum of its parts, but because they collectively reflect evolving recognition by
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the Navy culture that SC is a total fleet responsibility, that all deployed sailors, naval
assets, operations, and exercises are possible messengers. Admiral Mullen has reaf-
firmed an important internal U.S. government SC objective by making clear to all
members the chain of command their role: “They will be expected to understand and
foster cooperation in cultures far different from our own. They will be ambassadors,
educators, health care providers, mentors, and friends to a diverse cross-section of the
global community.”20 Strategic communication is no longer something unrelated unes-
sential to Navy power projection; it is central to the influence the Navy can exert to
assist in achieving national political objectives. A report on or a video of the USS Pearl
Harbor in Karachi unloading tons of food, blankets, and other supplies after a devastat-
ing earthquake supports the strategic narrative; the full soft-power persuasive effect is
achieved when information operations, public affairs, military diplomacy, defense sup-
port to public diplomacy, and visual information are artfully integrated.
The SCIG process in time will also create habits of integration and synergy. Navy SC is
aligning itself to make this happen. The Navy has recently put forth a plan to create an
internal Navy strategic communication process, overseen by a Navy SCIG, to imitate
the SCIG process and to be consistent with the Navy Enterprise model.21 An SC “Plan
Template” has been developed to ensure consistency. There is an SC Working Group
that will help decision making by identifying desired effects, key audiences, and the
communication environment, both “up front” and throughout the decision cycle.
There will be a small secretariat to oversee the process. Relevant codes or fleets will be
asked to develop communication plans. Importantly, fleet staffs, Navy Staff director-
ates, and regions can nominate issues to be addressed by leadership. The new process
helps Navy leadership look ahead, foresee unintended consequences of decisions, and
align itself with the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The second area where the Navy makes an impact, and an area emphasized in the
CNO’s Priority Memo, is in education and training. Indeed, no better investment can
be made than to educate designated officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians in the
value of strategic communication and the role they can play in it. Foreign area officer
programs also strengthen SC capabilities. To that end, interaction between foreign
naval officers and American ones, in either formal exchanges or exercises, helps create
personal bonds. Understanding foreign cultures is critical in the present environment,
and here Navy education can help bring forward expertise from the service, other U.S.
government agencies, and academia. Increasing foreign-language training is an obvious
must. Cultural situational awareness provides tactical and strategic advantages.
Thirdly, images can be force multipliers; the Navy can help by becoming a constant and
timely content provider. Foreign audiences can be influenced by viewing naval shaping
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activities, which would further underscore a perception of the United States as a
friendly country and amplify the distinctions between the United States and jihadists.
The Navy should look to collect routinely “video vignettes” of U.S. security, economic,
and humanitarian assistance, and, as bandwidth and production processing allow,
expeditiously disseminate them to U.S. government public diplomacy experts, who can
quickly make them available to foreign media. Much of the video equipment and
media personnel already resides in the Navy. The United States, working in coalition
with other nations to solve common problems, tells the right story, and when that story
is told by the other countries’ media it is even more impressive.
The story opportunities are numerous. An example is UNITAS 48-07, a multinational
exercise designed to increase interoperability of navies in the Americas (this year, par-
ticipants were Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, as well as Spain and the United States). It
was a great opportunity to work with South American navies. Concurrently, gifts of
toys and other products were made to a local charity under the auspices of Project
Handclasp, a program where gifts are presented by U.S. Navy personnel on behalf of
the American people. Sailors also took part in a wreath-laying ceremony commemorat-
ing the twenty-fifth anniversary of the loss of the cruiser ARA General Belgrano. Also, a
number of sailors helped to paint a hospital. Such exercises occur every year, and the
Navy interacts with dozens of countries annually. These events are the measure of
American goodwill, they can help America continually shape its image, and they need
to be covered by local media. The Navy already helps future SC efforts by proactively
and regularly providing video imagery content for news stories that State or DoD can
disseminate to a world audience.
Carrier strike groups (CSGs) and expeditionary strike groups carry public affairs com-
plements on board when they deploy. These teams could capture video of operations
and exercises that involve allies and transmit them, together with press releases, up the
chain and then quickly into awaiting media outlets in targeted countries. This would
have its own challenges—for instance, training, classification, and bandwidth, espe-
cially for ships not operating in a CSG or ESG—but it would be important coalition-
building work. The power of images, engaging ideas, and real-time information can
help mold world public opinion in America’s favor.
A fourth contribution, which is a natural follow-up to becoming a content provider, is
to work with foreign media in a proactive and sustained way. Navy media teams may
need their capabilities bolstered or supplemented from DoD’s Visual Information
office or JPASE, which together have immense media experience and equipment capa-
bility. As the Pakistani earthquake experience indicated, foreign media is often espe-
cially receptive to stories that benefit their country or show their national military
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involvement. This interaction with foreign media is a way to spread the message. When
possible and advisable, the Navy should invite foreign media aboard ship to report on
stories directly. Given the number of port visits by Navy ships each year, pictures and
interviews should be a regular part of Navy efforts to reach and engage friendly or neu-
tral audiences. Assistance from geographic combatant commanders and the State
Department in setting up media events will be necessary.
Also, the Navy has an assortment of vessels in the Military Sealift Command that per-
form extraordinary maritime missions, often in cooperation with other nations. For
instance, one oceanographic survey vessel, the USNS Bruce C. Heezen (T-AGS 64),
recently worked with the Philippine navy surveying its waters. The HSV-2 Swift under-
took a pirate-suppression mission for CENTCOM and on another occasion worked
with Panama for training in port security and port vulnerability. The hospital ship
USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) has provided tsunami relief, and Comfort (T-AH 20) assisted
during Hurricane Katrina. These ships are especially valuable as conveyors of American
goodwill and support to friends.
Fifth, the Navy needs to be a provider of ideas, concepts, and plans for expanding or
strengthening bilateral or regional influence. In a context of utilizing and synchronizing
diplomatic, information, military, and economic power, the “thousand-ship navy” repre-
sents a far-reaching concept that can be leveraged for SC aims. CNO Mullen’s TSN vision
has been articulated as “. . . a combination of national, international, and private-industry
cooperation to provide the platforms, people, and protocols necessary to secure the seas
against the transnational threat.”22 The strategic communication story is plain: a collec-
tion of like-minded nations agreeing voluntarily to share information and responsibility
against common threats. Everyone benefits. The opportunity is open to nations affected
by the transnational threats of “. . . piracy, smuggling, drug trading, illegal immigration,
banditry, human smuggling and slavery, environmental attack, trade disruption, weapons
proliferation including weapons of mass destruction, political and religious extremism,
and terrorism.”23 Global problems require coalition solutions.
Two current examples of how the TSN could work are CTF 150 and Operation
ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR. The former involves warships from Pakistan, France, the United
Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the United States, and others, that conduct mari-
time security operations in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the
Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean—altogether, an area of 2.5 million square miles. In
April 2006, a Pakistani admiral took charge of the combined task force. Under
ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, NATO naval vessels patrol the Mediterranean monitoring ship-
ping for possible terrorist activity. Russia and Ukraine have also participated; rela-
tionships are being extended to the Mediterranean Dialogue countries of Algeria,
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Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, and Mauritania. But how much of this important
work is viewed by foreign audiences?
TSN-related initiatives are SC “targets of opportunity”; they would reassure allies and
friends. They feed the strategic narrative of America as part of a vast coalition of nations
coming together to fight a common enemy. Admiral Mullen has realized the public-opinion
potential of Navy global efforts. In a January 2006 article he reflected on the Navy’s lead-
ing role in helping the people of Indonesia after the terrible December 2004 tsunami:
“We literally built a city at sea for no other purpose than to serve the needs of other peo-
ple. Aside from the lives we—along with our international partners—helped save, we
started changing hearts and minds.”24 The world saw the quick-response humanitarian
effort, and Indonesian public feelings toward America improved dramatically, but in time
opinion dipped again. Sustaining foreign opinion friendly to the United States will
become easier, however, as the relationships among TSN nations and in other programs
deepens and is made consistent.
India is a good example of how the TSN concept can reach out to a country that has
historically guarded its neutrality. One Indian naval analyst has stated that TSN’s
“information sharing would neither impinge on India’s sovereignty, nor would it con-
flict with international law.”25 Further, India has been facing a terrorist problem at
home, making it reconsider cooperative opportunities. Another Indian defense analyst
has suggested that the United States “needs to package it in a manner as to appeal not
just to navies, but also to governments and the lay public.”26 TSN appeals to nations to
fight common problems like international terrorism together; for the United States the
appeal is in the realization that the maritime problems it faces are greater than it can
manage alone. Recently Admiral Mullen appealed to the visiting head of the Chinese
navy, Vice Admiral Wu Shengli, to consider participation in TSN.27
There are other maritime venues too that can be exploited for positive publicity. For
instance, the National Strategy for Maritime Security articulates why securing the mari-
time domain is so important for all countries. The International Outreach and Coordina-
tion Strategy lays out numerous initiatives to implement it.28 A strategic communication
plan should accompany such multinational endeavors, to bring to life diplomacy and
international cooperation. For instance, the Proliferation Security Initiative is a story of
regional and global naval cooperation to prevent dangerous military items from being
shipped. These are all newsworthy, and they provide stories for shaping world opinion.
As the CNO has said, “every nation has a stake in global security and stability, and a dis-
tinct, unique capability, as well as a great desire, to contribute. Our goal is to extend the
peace through an inter-connected community of maritime nations.”29
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Lastly, the Navy helps the effort through its consolidation and integration of depart-
ments that have a role in “operationalizing” information. In order to provide better
information-operations support to combatant and Navy component commanders, the
Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM) has recently subsumed a number
of disparate offices involved in intelligence and information operations.30 Additionally,
Navy Information Operation Centers and Fleet Information Officer Centers are collo-
cated with National Security Agency cryptologic centers; the latter will now directly
support NETWARCOM. Service and national capabilities are being aligned the better
to support the warfighter. Tools like “Internet Relay Chat” have increased situational
awareness by allowing users to exchange information across the world, disseminating
intelligence, creating an unclassified common operating picture, and thereby helping
realize the thousand-ship navy.31 Therefore, information operations and intelligence are
being restructured to enhance Navy informational capabilities; the challenge will be to
exploit better intelligence and translate it into influence in the “open” world. The nar-
rative of the thousand-ship navy is one cooperation, not U.S. hegemony—and this
must be more effectively communicated.
In the new strategic paradigm, the Navy has an increasing political-military role to
play. The Navy’s commitment to expand its informational capabilities is paying divi-
dends through bringing nations and new capabilities together to fight common ene-
mies. A strategic narrative is forming to bring consistency and purpose to national
efforts. A new Navy strategic communication process, reorganization, new concepts,
and investment in people and training will make the Navy a powerful contributor to
those efforts. In the present strategic environment, the Navy has important SC advan-
tages. Each ship and each sailor is potentially an SC asset. The fleet offers presence, but
without a large footprint. The Navy can go almost anywhere. In the ideological battle,
where information and images mean influence, the Navy’s good works need to become
content for U.S. government strategic communication efforts with other friendly gov-
ernments and foreign media—content that helps keep populations aligned to the
United States.
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
A AFRICOM [U.S.] African Command
AIS Automated Identification System
AOR area of responsibility
C CDAC-PAK Combined Disaster Assistance Center–Pakistan
CENTCOM [U.S.] Central Command
CINC commander in chief
CJTF-HOA Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa
CNE Commander Naval Forces Europe
CNE-C6F Commander Naval Forces Europe–Commander Sixth Fleet
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
CSG carrier strike group
CSI Container Security Initiative
CTF Commander Task Force
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
C6F Commander Sixth Fleet
D DIME diplomatic, information, military and economic
DoD [DOD] [U.S.] Department of Defense
DSPD defense support to public diplomacy
E ESG expeditionary strike group
EUCOM [U.S.] European Command
F FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia]
FMF Foreign Military Financing
FY fiscal year
G GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GFS Global Fleet Station
GMP Global Maritime Partnership
GOG Gulf of Guinea
H HIV/AIDS human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency
syndrome
I IGO intergovernmental organization
IMET International Military Education and Training
J JCA joint capability area
JCTD joint capability technology demonstration
JOC joint operating concept
JPASE Joint Public Affairs Support Element
J7 [Joint Staff] Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development
M MDA maritime domain awareness
MPP Maritime Partnership Program
MSP mission strategic plan
MSSIS Maritime Safety and Security Information System
N NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NETWARCOM Naval Network Warfare Command
NGO nongovernmental organization
NMSP-WOT National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism
O OAE Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR
OBSH Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY
P PAO public affairs officer
PfP Partnership for Peace
PKK Kurdistan Workers Party [Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan]
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PSI Proliferation Security Initiative
Q QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
R RMAC Regional Maritime Awareness Capability
RMSI Regional Maritime Security Initiative
S SC strategic communication
SCIG Strategic Communication Integration Group
SOUTHCOM [U.S.] Southern Command
T TSC theater security cooperation
TSCP theater security cooperation plan
TSN thousand-ship navy
U UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
USMC U.S. Marine Corps
W WMD weapons of mass destruction
WMD/E weapons of mass destruction or effects
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